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Abstract. This thesis seeks to answer the overarching question of how the black market for
medical abortion is regulated in Chile. In answering this question, this thesis responds to the two
sub questions: why is the Chilean government ineffective at regulating the black market for
medical abortion in Chile, and how have non-governmental actors filled this vacuum through
informal regulation? Although the Chilean government has one of the highest levels of state
capacity in Latin America, it has surprisingly allowed this black market to exist in almost
complete impunity. In this thesis, I argue that although the Chilean government has the capacity
to regulate this market, that government bureaucrats intentionally choose to ignore the existence
of this activity in the efforts of upholding their professional norms and interests; the market leads
to decreased abortion-related complications, to a reduction in the maternal mortality rate, and to
decreased costs for clinics related to the upkeep of expensive emergency septic units. However,
to combat some of the dangers that exist within an unregulated market, NGOs have emerged to
create an informal regulation of the black market through three mechanisms: provision of
information, exposure, and price reduction. Consequently, this thesis seeks to understand how
both the formal and informal regulation by government officials and non-state actors of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile functions, and if these theories can be applied to other cases of
illegal activity.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Despite its emphasis on progressive economics and politics, Chile remains one of six
countries worldwide (including the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Malta, and the
Vatican City) where abortion is banned in all cases (Buchanan 2015). Although a bill that would
seek to legalize abortion for therapeutic purposes (if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest,
if there is fetal malformation, or if there is risk to the mother’s life or health) is currently being
reviewed by the Constitutional Commission before it moves to a debate in the Higher Chamber,
the likelihood that this bill will become law is uncertain, as lawmakers are deeply divided over
this issue (Amado et. al 2010, 119; Telesur 2016). As of 2017, in Chile, if a woman has had an
abortion or a doctor has performed this abortion surgery, they can be subject to up to five years
in prison (Jones 2014). As a result, many women resort to highly dangerous methods to induce
abortion at home, which can include a variety of tactics from the insertion of catheters to a mix
of traditional methods (Shepard 2007, 203). However, in the past fifteen years, the introduction
of Misoprostol (known as Misotrol in Chile) as a method to medically induce abortion has
changed the scenario for reproductive health in Chile drastically.
Misoprostol has become the method of choice for women who seek abortions in Chile.
As abortion data is difficult to obtain, there is little survey data on the true numbers of abortions
that are performed in Chile each year. However, in 1990 it was estimated that 160,000 abortions
were performed annually (which is a rate of 45 per 1,000 for women aged 15-49). More recently,
a study estimated that abortion rates could be anywhere from 60,000 to 300,000 each year (Prada
and Ball 2016). Although the ratio of the number of abortions to abortion prosecutions is low,
between January 2011 and September 2012, 310 cases of abortion were tried and prosecuted in
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Chile, a number which is much higher than in most countries in the world (Casas and Vivaldi
2014, 72).
Misoprostol, a drug which is available through prescription to prevent stomach ulcers,
has the side effect of inducing miscarriage (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 73). Misoprostol has greatly
reduced the risk of infection from abortion throughout the region of Latin America. In the
Dominican Republic, the introduction of Misoprostol decreased the rate of severe complications
related to abortion by 75% (Kulczycki 2011, 205). In Chile, the introduction of Misoprostol,
along with improved access to contraceptives, has contributed to a drop in the country’s
mortality ratio from 55 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990, to only 22 deaths per 100,000 live
births in 2013 (Prada and Ball 2016). One academic, Ramiro Molina, argued that Misoprostol
was the sole cause of the reduction of the rate of septic abortions in Chile, which used to be a
large problem during the 1980s (Fernázdez 2014).
In 2014, Misoprostol could be purchased on the black market in Chile for prices ranging
anywhere from US $70-215 (although this price continues to rise with increasing demand)
(Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 74). The market for Misoprostol exists partially as an online black
market, which fills a demand for the drug all throughout Chile. Surprisingly, Misoprostol is both
casual and easy to obtain in Chile. In the last five years, the market has surged through cites such
as “Red Interactiva de Estudiantes” and community forums such as “todomercado.com.”
Furthermore, Chilean reporters argue that even after five years of growth, the market “todavía
existe en total impunidad” (still exists in complete impunity) (González 2007). Women report
that Misoprostol is sold on “practically every street corner,” and that it is even easier to find on
the internet; ‘“I looked it up on the internet, and it was full of adverts, full, full, full, all saying “I
sell Misotrol, I sell Misotrol”’ recounted one women who had sought to end her pregnancy
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through medical methods (Jones 2011). Furthermore, the rates of prosecution of the illegal sale
of Misoprostol are also low; between 2012 and 2014, there were only twenty cases brought to
court of the illegal sale of abortive drugs (Fernández 2014).
Chile is one of the most politically and economically stable countries in Latin America.
According to the Democracy Index 2014, it rates among the top countries in Latin America on
functioning of government, and it has some of the lowest rates of corruption in the region,
coupled with high rates of economic growth and freedom (Youngs 2015, 44). Miguel Centeno
and Alejandro Portes argue that “the relationship between the state and the informal economy
is…cyclically casual and negatively correlated. In general, the weaker the state, the greater the
likelihood of an economy being able to escape its grasp” (Centeno and Portes 2006, 29).
Consequently, in a strong and politically and economically stable state such as Chile, we would
expect the government to be able to regulate informal or illicit economies that emerge within its
borders. However, this has clearly not been the case with Misoprostol. As a result, this thesis
seeks to answer the overarching question of how the regulation of Misoprostol functions in
Chile. In answering this question, this thesis responds to two sub questions: why is the Chilean
government ineffective at regulating the black market for medical abortion in Chile, and how
have non-governmental actors emerged to fill this vacuum through informal regulation?
There has been a significant amount of research conducted on why countries in Latin
America (and Chile specifically) have not legalized abortion, by authors such as Merike Blofied
(2001) and Mala Htun (2003). These authors argue that the strength of anti-abortion movements
coupled with public ambivalence has increased the political risks for politicians and parties so
greatly that the coalition in favor of the legalization of abortion is prohibitively small (Htun
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2003, 143). However, these arguments do not directly relate to the regulation of medical
abortion, and cannot explain why the black market for abortion remains large in Chile.
Additionally, many sociologists have studied the relationship between government
regulation and state strength, and the rise of informal and illegal markets. However, the majority
of these authors support the thesis of Centeno and Portes: strong states contain only small and
weak informal markets, which is not the case of Misoprostol in Chile (Centeno and Portes 2006,
29). Authors that focus on the rise of informal markets in areas with strong states tend to attribute
their emergence to the diffusion of international labor costs, which causes businesses to move
underground; the process of industrialization, which leads to low enforcement of previously set
state standards (as a means of gaining a comparative advantage); and economic crises in the
1970s, which forced workers to seek whatever jobs (licit or illicit) that were available (Portes and
Castells 1989, 29).
However, these causes are more illustrative of informal markets such as unlicensed taxi
drivers, and are unable to explain why a government would be unable to regulate expanding
black markets. Additionally, the scope of the study of black markets generally focuses on the
ways in which these markets lead to the reduction of citizenship and to the rise of gangs, which
is not illustrative of the rise of the illegal market for Misoprostol in Chile, as the sellers are
individuals rather than gangs (Yashar 2013). Consequently, this thesis seeks to respond to this
gap in the literature about the regulation of black markets, in the efforts to add to theories about
the creation of black markets, the lack of government regulation, and the emergence of informal
regulation.
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Motivations for Research
Although Chile portrays itself as a modern and progressive country, it is actually a
socially conservative society (evidenced by the fact that divorce was illegal until 2005) (Shepard
and Becerra 2007, 206). In Chile, therapeutic abortion was legal between 1931 and 1989.
However, during Pinochet’s last few weeks in office, he included a “right to life” clause in the
Chilean Constitution, that remains in Chile’s Constitution today. This clause states that “every
person has a right to life, and the law will protect the right of the unborn” (Casas-Becerra 1997,
29). The Chilean criminal legislation was modeled after the Spanish Criminal Code of 1950.
However, while the Spanish code has been updated many times to adapt to changing contexts,
the Chilean Criminal Code has remained unchanged (Casas-Becerra 1997, 29). Since 1989, there
have been three attempts to liberalize the Criminal Code to allow therapeutic abortion in Chile,
but they have all failed. This failure is largely due to the strong presence of opposition from
Congress’ Right to Life bench which includes both right-wing opponents and center-left
members, such as the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, these groups have introduced several
proposals that seek even greater penalization of abortion, including seven bills that were
introduced in less than a year following Bachelet’s election in 2006 (Shepard and Becerra 2007,
206).
The illegality of abortion is particularly problematic because it leads to large amounts of
social inequity, as those who resort to unsafe abortion methods (leading to dangerous
complications) are much more likely to be adolescents and poor women (Shepard and Becerra
2007, 202). These women either seek unsafe methods due to the prohibitive costs of abortion
(illegality greatly increases the cost of safe abortion), or because of abortion stigma, which can
lead women to choose clandestine methods of abortion in the efforts to maintain secrecy
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(Blofield 2008, 403; Annik et al. 2016, 421-422). Additionally, even in countries where abortion
is legalized under a limited number of circumstances, there are few countries that have hospital
protocols to ensure the quality of abortion and post-abortion care (Kulczycki 2011, 205). Studies
have found that the prohibition of abortion does not greatly decrease its use; rather it forces it to
take place in potentially dangerous settings where its performance by untrained practitioners can
cause infections and hemorrhaging (Blofield 2008, 403-404).
Furthermore, wealthy women (upper/middle class Chileans) are rarely ever charged with
having abortions (and rarely have abortion-related complications) because they are able to have
this procedure done by doctors in private hospitals, where they are treated for “appendicitis.” In
contrast, poor women are much more likely to have to resort to “back alley” abortions that lead
to complications that must be treated in public hospitals, where they may be reported to the
police and face abortion charges (Casas and Becerra 1997, 35). In these cases, medical
confidentiality is violated, as doctors are legally obligated to report potential crimes to the
authorities, while at the same time the Criminal Procedures Code exempts them from having to
reveal details about the abortion in court. This contradictory understanding of patient-doctor
confidentiality has dangerous implications for the women involved. One 16-year old woman
reported ‘“I remember the nurses telling me that if I didn’t give the name of the doctor who gave
me the abortion, they would let me bleed to death’” (Shepard and Becerra 2007, 204). Cases
such as these demonstrate that poor women in Chile experience differential treatment including
violations of “the right to life, health, privacy, due process, legal representation, and equal
treatment under the law” (Casas and Beccera 1997, 35).
The criminalization of therapeutic abortion has created an unequal society in Chile,
where only wealthy women are able to fully realize their constitutional rights. The status of
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abortion in Chile motivated this thesis, as the emergence and growth of the use of Misoprostol
over the past fifteen years has dramatically changed the environment in Chile in regards to
abortion (as described above). Misoprostol has become the method of choice for women who
seek abortions (particularly young women with internet access), and it returns a degree of agency
to those who are denied by the law the right to choose.
Misoprostol has helped to reduce levels of maternal mortality (as it replaces riskier
methods of abortions and reduces abortion-related complications), but there is a darker side to an
unregulated and illegal market; an “unregulated market implies wrong information and
unavoidable misunderstandings” where counterfeit pills and dangerously high doses can put
women who seek medical abortion at risk (Harper et al. 2007, 68; Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 74).
Furthermore, academics have labeled the sellers of these drugs as “verdaderas mafias” (true
mafias), that occasionally sell fake pills and often provide their clients with incorrect, and
potentially dangerous, information about dosage (Informe Annual 2013, 95). As a result, this
thesis seeks to investigate broad questions, such as how Misoprostol is obtained, how it is
regulated, and how its presence impacts the scene of reproductive health in Chile. More
specifically, I will try to explain why and how the black market for Misoprostol is able to
flourish within Chile’s institutionally strong and socially conservative environment, and the ways
in which NGOs have emerged to reduce the harms of this unregulated market.

What Forms Can Regulation Take?
In this thesis, I argue that regulation can take a variety of different forms. As Cross and
Peña argue, regulation occurs as a way of socially managing risks that take place when
individuals become involved in transactions with other individuals. Regulation and risk
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management involve the reduction of uncertainty within interactions between individuals, to
make these interactions more predictable, and to reduce asymmetries of knowledge that may
exist between these individuals. With an increase in impersonal interactions, one of the state’s
roles has become regulating these interactions to ensure stability within the marketplace. The
traditional role of the state has been to regulate this formal marketplace, which involves an area
of state-approved practices of production and distribution (Cross and Peña 2006, 48-51). The
difference between this formal marketplace and an informal marketplace is determined less by
the products that are sold within it, and more by the ways in which the products are produced or
sold (for example, clothing, medications, or automobile parts- which are legal commodities- may
become part of an informal market based on the way that they were made or sold) (Portes et. al
1989, 15). Furthermore, some actors may decide to subvert the dominant regulatory system
through the creation of “underground” or “black” markets which are defined by their illegality
(such as illegal drug selling). The difference between the informal market and the illegal market
is that in the informal market, products may be legal, but were produced in illegal ways, versus
the illegal nature of the products sold on the black market (Cross and Peña 2006, 51).
In this thesis, I examine the different types of regulation that take place in the black
market for Misoprostol (defined as “black” because Misoprostol is illegal outside of hospitals),
and the different levels of regulation that take place within this market. In the figure below
(Figure 1), I have created a diagram of the different forms that regulation can take. I have
defined “formal regulation” as regulation by the state of a specific activity; whereas, I define
informal regulation as the regulation of an activity by non-state actors, such as NGOs. In this
diagram, I have also separated regulation into the categories of “strong” and “weak.” The ways
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in which “strong” or “weak” regulation occur depends on the types of actors involved, and the
types of activities that they attempt to regulate.
In the case of strong, formal regulation, one example we see is the state regulation of the
“formal marketplace” described above. In this case, strong, formal regulation can occur when the
state intervenes in a market to become the “remedy” to market failures, preventing conflicts in
the market place, and reducing these market failures. States can also act as strong, formal
regulators of informal activities, such as street vending. For example, in Washington D.C., street
vendors must get their permits from local governments, and if they do not have permits, they
may be prosecuted (Cross and Peña 2006, 51-77). In the case of the government regulation for
Misoprostol in Chile, one would expect this case to fit within the category of “strong, formal
regulation” as one would predict that the government would crackdown on the sale and purchase
of this illegal drug. However, we have not seen this outcome take place, and instead there is a
flourishing black market for Misoprostol, with very little efforts made by the government to
investigate or reduce its presence.
On the lower, right-hand corner of Figure 1, we have an area of formal, weak regulation.
In this case, although regulation still occurs through the state, it is weak or ineffective. There are
a variety of reasons why formal, weak regulation exists, which will be described in greater detail
in Chapter 5. The result of weak, formal regulation is often the emergence of large informal or
black markets. One of the reasons for weak, formal regulation is a lack of state capacity,
meaning that although the state would like to shut down this informal or illicit activity, they may
not have the resources to do so (Cross and Peña 2006, 29). However, weak, formal regulation
may also be the result of deliberate decisions by government actors. For example, Holland’s
theory of forbearance “or intentional and revocable government leniency towards violations of
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the law” describes how government officials may embark on a policy of formal, weak
enforcement as a redistributive mechanism (Holland 2016, 233). For example, in the case of
street vending in Santiago, Chile, Holland describes how mayors have used forbearance (not
cracking down on street venders) as a way of expanding welfare goods, in the efforts to gain
support from poor voters (Holland 2016, 242). Moreover, the formal, Chilean government-run
regulation of the black market for Misoprostol would fit within this category of formal, weak
regulation. Although the Chilean government knows about the existence of this black market,
and I will argue would have the capacity to regulate it, we have seen that there is very weak
regulation of this market (a phenomenon that will be described further in Chapters 3, 4, and 5).
The lower, left-hand corner of Figure 1 represents the third form that regulation can take:
informal, weak regulation. In the case where formal regulation is non-existent or weak, informal
regulation can emerge in some cases to take its place. Informal regulation occurs when a nonstate actor uses the resources at its disposal in an attempt to regulate a specific activity (which
could be legal, informal, or illegal). For example, there are many cases where NGOs have
attempted to regulate market activity through a variety of forms, from threating to shame an actor
(through public disclosures of information) that they view as engaging in harmful behavior (for
example, posting an industries’ level of pollution) to pressuring formal regulators to increase
enforcement standards. However, depending on the situation, a non-state actor may be able to
have a large amount of influence on an actor’s behavior (leading to strong, informal regulation),
or may be restricted in their ability to influence markets (leading to weak, informal regulation).
For example, one case describes how in India, the press has appeared as an informal-regulator of
polluting industries, as the government does not act as an effective regulatory force. Although
news coverage did have some influence on polluters’ behaviors, the effect was not very large or
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immediate, largely due to the fact that there was a lack in sustained publicity about the polluters’
behaviors. Consequently, although the Indian press attempted to act as an informal regulator of
polluting industries, its inability to create widespread change would place it in the category of
“weak, informal regulation” (Kathura 2007, 403-417).
Finally, in the upper-right hand corner of Figure 1 exists the category of “strong, informal
regulation.” Strong, informal regulation often exists in cases of illegal markets, where the state is
unable to enforce the norms and contracts of the market. In this case, non-state actors may
materialize to take over the “power vacuum” that the state lacks the ability to fill, by providing
the service of regulation to the population. One example of strong, informal regulation is the
mafia-controlled market for cocaine in New York City. Mafia-style organizations often emerge
in advanced societies, when the state makes an activity illegal. This illegal activity oftentimes
leads to the creation of mafias that attempt to regulate competition and provide protection for
members of the market, in exchange for a portion of the rent obtained from the illegal activity. In
the case of the market for cocaine in New York City, mafias replace the state’s role of enforcer
through its “monopoly of the legitimate use of threat or force,” and act as strong, informal
regulators of this market (Cross and Peña 2006, 60). The informal regulation of the black market
for Misoprostol in Chile would fit into the category of strong, informal regulation, although it is
obviously extremely different from the mafia-controlled market for cocaine in New York City. In
Chile, NGOs act as informal regulators of the black market for Misoprostol through a variety of
mechanisms, from information provision to influencing the price of the medication (these
mechanisms are detailed in Chapter 6). Because the Chilean state is unable to effectively regulate
this illegal market, NGOs have taken on this role, greatly increasing the safety of this market for
the women who seek it, in a process of strong, informal regulation.
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Figure 1: Forms of Regulation

STRONG REGULATION
Ex: The mafia-regulated
market for cocaine in
New York City
Ex: State regulation of the
“formal marketplace”

Chilean NGOs’
regulation of the black
market for Misoprostol

FORMAL REGULATION

INFORMAL REGULATION

Ex: Holland’s theory of
forbearance

Ex: Press regulation of
industrial polluters in India

The Chilean government’s
regulation of the black
market for Misoprostol

WEAK REGULATION
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This theory about the ability of NGOs to regulate illegal markets is distinct from the
majority of literature about informal regulation (which generally discusses NGOs’ abilities to
regulate formal or informal markets, rather than illicit markets), and contributes to a broader
scholarly debate about this topic. Having descried the concept of “regulation” that I use in this
thesis; outlined the four different forms that regulation can take: strong-formal, strong-informal,
weak-informal, and strong-informal; and situated the two different types of regulation of the
black market for medical abortion in Chile (formal and informal) within this framework, as a
means of contextualizing the different forms of regulation that this market has taken, I will now
discuss my methods of data collection for this thesis.

Data Collection:
To provide evidence for my argument, I rely on a mix of eighteen semi-structured
interviews, primary sources, and secondary sources. During the month of January, I conducted
interviews in Santiago, Chile. Sixteen of these interviews were in person, and two were over
Skype. I also received two email responses to a list of questions that I sent to two actors, an NGO
employee (MILES Chile), and a pro-life lawyer and professor at Universidad Católica, Paulina
Ramos Vergara, who were both unreachable for interviews. During my fieldwork, I interviewed
seven categories of actors: members of national and international reproductive-health focused
NGOs, government officials, doctors, constitutional lawyers, social workers, Masters students,
and professors.
During this process, I interviewed three employees of feminist NGOs that provide
women with access to information about Misoprostol. I interviewed Angela Erpel from the NGO
Línea Aborto Libre (the Abortion Hotline), María José from Con las Amigas y en la Casa (With
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Friends and in the Home), and I interviewed one employee who works for both Línea Aborto
Libre and Women Help Women- an organization that provides information about the use of
Misoprostol, and provides women with access to contraception, emergency contraception, and
Misoprostol/Mifepristone. Additionally, I interviewed five people who work in government
ministries: Dr. Juan Baeza who works for the Ministry of Health in Valparaíso, is the regional
head of el Programa de Salud de Adolescentes y Jóvenes (the Program of Child and Adolescent
Health), and is the regional coordinator of Salud Sexual y Reproductiva (Sexual and
Reproductive Health), two officials who work for the Ministry of Health in Santiago, and are
part of la Programa de la Mujer (the Women’s Program) within the Ministry of Health (one,
Dra. Paulina Troncoso is a gynecologist and professor, and the other, Mat. Eduardo Soto, is a
midwife), and two women who work for the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity, and
oversaw the creation of the Ley de Tres Causales (the Therapeutic Abortion Law).
During my fieldwork, I also interviewed six doctors: Dr. Ramiro Molina- a professor at la
Universidad de Chile, a gynecologist/obstetrician, and the creator of an online sexual education
course in Chile; Dr. Juan Pablo Beca, a professor at La Universidad de Desarrollo, the founder of
the Center of Bioethics, and a surgeon (with a specialty in Neonatology); Dr. Mauricio Besio, a
pro-life associate professor at La Universidad de Chile and a gynecologist/obstetrician; Dr.
Fernando Zegers, a professor at la Universidad de Diego Portales, a gynecologist/obstetrician,
and a medical expert to the UN in 2002; Dr. Rene Castro, a professor at La Universidad de Diego
Portales, a gynecologist/obstetrician, and a past employee of the Ministry of Health; and Dr.
Dominique Truan, a doctor who works in high-risk obstetrics in a private clinic.
Additionally, I interviewed two constitutional lawyers: Rodolfo Figueroa, a professor at
la Universidad de Diego Portales who studies abortion as a constitutional right, and Yanira
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Zuniga, a professor at la Universidad Austral de Chile who studies human rights, gender, and
abortion, and attended (as an expert) a session of la Comisión de Constitución del Senado (which
voted 3 to 2 in favor of the Ley de Tres Causales). In this process, I also interviewed one social
worker, Luis Rodriguez, who works in primary healthcare, and works directly with patients and
their families in Chile. I also interviewed one Masters student from La Universidad de
Desarrollo, Nicolás Perry (who studied within the Bioethics Department), and who I got in
contact with, and was supervised in his project by, Dr. Juan Pablo Beca. His project focused on
the black market for Misoprostol and the impact of Women Help Women in Chile. Finally, I
interviewed one professor from la Universidad de Chile within the Instituto de Comunicación e
Imagen (The Institute of Images and Communication) about her work studying the online
coverage and market for abortion in Chile. The majority of my interview contacts were gained
through snowball sampling. My initial contacts were made by emailing Chilean authors of
articles that related to my topic, such as Dr. Juan Pablo Beca, whose name I found after visiting
the Ministry of Health’s library and learning about his work. I also gained two contacts, Dr. Juan
Baeza and Luis Rodriguez, through former honor’s thesis student, Cam Coval’s
recommendation.
I had initially wanted to interview someone from la Brigada del Cibercrimen (the
Cybercrime Brigade) within the Policía de Investigaciones (the Investigate Police) in Chile, but
after making multiple calls, sending many emails, and visiting the Policía de Investigaciones
(PDI) three times to request an interview, I came to the conclusion by the end of my fieldwork
that it would not be possible for me to obtain this interview. Although this was an unfortunate
circumstance, it meant that I could instead put my energy into trying to obtain interviews with a
wide variety of actors. I decided to interview two pro-life actors (one doctor and one lawyer),
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because I felt that it would be important in my thesis to balance the voices of some of the very
strong pro-choice, lesbian/feminist actors that interviewed, and to provide a varied perspective
and logic behind the conservative opposition to abortion, and the Ley de Tres Causales.
The second type of source that I used for evidence in my thesis was primary sources. I
used documents from the Ministry of Health: Ordinance A15 number 1404 and Ordinance A15
number 1675 on patient-provider confidentiality, Línea Aborto Libre’s Manual: Línea Aborto
Chile: El Manual, the documentary La Línea del Aborto, and a variety of technical guides and
research from organizations such as FLAGSOG, WHO, and MILES. I integrated these primary
sources in a variety of ways throughout this thesis. I used the Ministry of Health ordinances to
provide evidence for specific Ministry of Health Policy on doctor-patient confidentiality, to
demonstrate the contradictions within policies related to hospital procedures in reporting
abortions. I used the documentary La Línea del Aborto, and the manual Línea Aborto Chile: El
Manual, to provide evidence for Chapter 6, on the informal regulation of the black market and
the role of Línea Aborto Libre in this informal regulation. I used these technical guides primarily
in describing international policies and procedures for Misoprostol, and in describing MILES’
work in Chile. Finally, I also used a variety of different websites and Facebook pages from
NGOs, such as Línea Aborto Libre, Con las Amigas y en la Casa, Women on Web; from online
venders of Misoprostol, such as Vendomisotrol and Ventamisotrolchile; and from the Chilean
government, such as #YoApoyo3Causales. I used these websites to provide information about
these different actors and organizations, and to learn more about how the black market for
Misoprostol, and the informal regulation of this black market, functioned in practice.
The third type of source that I used for my thesis was secondary sources from a variety of
different types of academics and newspapers. I used these sources throughout my thesis in a
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combination of different ways. The first way that I used these sources was to provide a literature
review within each chapter. In using these sources, I was able to situate each chapter within a
scholarly debate about the topics being discussed, and was able to frame my argument in relation
to this literature. The second way that I used these sources was to provide facts to back up my
argument about a variety of different topics within this thesis, from the numbers of women
arrested for abortion-related charges in Chile, to speculations about the numbers of abortions
performed each year in Chile. The combination of my interviews with a variety of actors, who
each added unique perspectives about the regulation of the black market for Misoprostol in
Chile, with my primary and secondary sources, allowed me to gain a wide mix of opinions and
data to provide evidence for my argument.

Overview of the Thesis
The overarching argument of this thesis is that the black market for abortion in Chile
exists in a space of formal (governmental) and informal regulation that involves a complex
variety of actors with differing motivations and levels of presence within this market. I make the
argument that although the Chilean government has the ability to regulate this market,
government bureaucrats intentionally choose to ignore the existence of this activity in the efforts
of upholding their professional norms and interests. As a result, this thesis is titled “La Política
del Avestruz” (the Politics of the Ostrich) because this is how one informant, Dr. Juan Pablo
Beca, described the government regulation of this black market. Dr. Beca, similar to many of my
informants, argued that although everyone knows that this market exists, they choose to ignore it.
Consequently, like ostriches, government bureaucrats “stick their heads in the sand” and choose
to ignore the presence of this illegal activity (Author interview with Beca, January 11, 2017).
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These bureaucrats are motivated by the considerations that the presence of the black market for
Misoprostol leads to decreased abortion-related complications, to a reduction in Chile’s maternal
mortality rate, and to reduced costs for clinics, related to the upkeep of expensive emergency
septic units.
However, because there is a lack of formal, governmental regulation of the black market,
there are also a variety of dangers that exist within this unregulated space. I make the claim that
this black market encompasses a variety of sub-categories of black markets, that contain actors
with a range of different motivations for selling the drug, from simply making a profit, to
providing women with autonomy in their reproductive health. However, because there are
differing motivations within this black market there are also many potential dangers, such as fake
information and pills. Consequently, a variety of national and international NGOs have emerged
to act as informal regulators of this black market. As a result, this thesis seeks to understand how
both the formal and informal regulation by government officials and non-state actors of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile functions, and if these theories can be applied to other cases of
illegal activity worldwide.
The objective of the second chapter of my thesis is to illuminate the history of abortion
law in Latin America and Chile, the distinct societal actors that affected these laws, and how this
history has affected the current situation of the emergence of a black market for abortion in Chile
and in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To accomplish this goal, this chapter includes a
history of abortion law and reform in Latin America, from the creation of the first criminal codes
during the 19th century, to pushes for reform following the military dictatorships of the 1970s
and 80s. The next section discusses the influence of the Catholic Church on abortion law in Latin
America, as one of the main reasons why Chile and countries in LAC have had difficulty in
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liberalizing their abortion laws. Then, the chapter analyzes why Chile has had difficulties in
liberalizing its abortion law, and ends with a description of the current situation of abortion and
abortion laws in Chile, whose largely restrictive nature has spurred the creation of a black market
for abortion in Chile, and a “need” for greater regulation.
The objective of the third chapter is to answer the question: What is the structure of the
black market for Misoprostol in Chile, and how does it function? In answering this question, I
break this chapter into three different parts, based on the three different types of black markets in
Chile: the traditional black market for abortion, which can be broken into two subcategories of
men whose main motive for selling Misoprostol is profit, and medical professionals, whose
motivation for selling the medication is also to supply women with a safe means of aborting; the
“parallel market” run by local and international NGOs; and the market fueled by wealthy women
and private clinics. In detailing these three different types of black markets, I also respond to the
questions: how is each type of market accessed, who/what drives each market, and how do
transactions within each market occur?
The purpose of the fourth chapter is to respond to the question: how does the government
regulation of the black market for medical abortion function? Having outlined in the previous
chapter how the black market functions, in Chapter four, I seek to understand in what places of
the black market government officials would be able to pursue regulation, and to what extent this
regulation is actually occurring, as a way of demonstrating discrepancies between policies and
enforcement. This chapter is broken into the categories of black market described above, and
within each category, I first describe what “full regulation” would look like, and then
demonstrate how this “ideal” is different from the actual experience of government regulation of
these different categories of black market. I then examine a variety of cases where sellers and
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providers of the market have actually been charged for providing women with Misoprostol or
abortions, as well as cases where women who have had abortions and their “accomplices” have
been prosecuted, as a way of demonstrating governmental priorities in the regulation of this
black market.
In the fifth chapter of this thesis, I shift from discussing the ways in which governmental
figures fall short in their regulation of the black market for abortion in Chile, to presenting three
hypotheses for why the Chilean government has been unable or unwilling to implement the
regulation of the black market for abortion. The first hypothesis that I examine is that there are
differing levels of regulation based on the different types of actors involved in the market. The
motivation behind this hypothesis would be that one could imagine that the government would
be more willing to prosecute the traditional black market, which is run in a manner more
associated with typical “criminals,” than the parallel market, which is made up of international
NGOs that are well-known and respected, or the private market for abortions, which are
conducted in private clinics by doctors who are also well-respected in Chilean society. The
second hypothesis that I test is that levels of governmental regulation do not depend on type of
actor, and rather, that a lack of regulation is due to bureaucrats’ desires to uphold the norms of
their positions and to protect their interests (through the mechanisms of a drop in the maternal
mortality rate/complications related to abortions, and a reduction in hospital costs). The final
(alternative) hypothesis that I unpack is that low rates of government regulation are caused by a
lack of information about the black market, and a lack of government capacity, rather than
government officials’ conscious decisions.
The sixth chapter of this thesis seeks to answer the questions: Why did NGOs decide to
take on the role of informally regulating the black market for Misoprostol in Chile, and how does
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this informal regulation function? In answering these questions, I first outline the dangers of an
unregulated black market for Misoprostol in Chile, which promoted NGOs to form or expand
their missions to seek to regulate these unregulated spaces. I next highlight the literature about
NGOs’ tools in pressuring different actors, and will apply these theories to the case of the
informal regulation of the black market for Misoprostol. Finally, I describe the three ways that
these NGOs attempt to provide an informal regulation of this market: regulation through
information, regulation through exposure of sellers, doctors, and clinics, and regulation through
price reduction of the medication.
The final, concluding chapter of this thesis attempts to analyze the arguments developed
throughout this thesis, as a way of situating these claims in a broader academic discussion about
black markets, government regulation, and informal regulation. In this conclusion, I emphasize
this thesis’ theoretical contributions, areas for future research in the topics highlighted within this
thesis, and potential limitations of this thesis’ design. Finally, I conclude by mentioning two
current developments in Chile in the area of reproductive health, which could have future
implications for the black market for medical abortion in Chile: el Ley de Tres Causales and
sexual education reforms.
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CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF ABORTION AND ABORTION LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Introduction
Despite overall improvements in reproductive health in Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) during the last twenty years, abortion remains a complicated and unsafe process. The
maternal mortality ratio fell by forty-one percent between 1990 and 2008, birth rates dropped
towards replacement rate, and contraceptive use has increased, spurring the downward trend in
abortion rates throughout the region (Kulczycki 2011, 201-202). However, in 2008 abortion rates
remained at a high level of approximately 4.2 million (reported abortions) conducted in Latin
America each year (Kulcyzchi 2011, 202; Shepard and Casas 2007, 203). Furthermore, many of
the abortions conducted in Latin America are conducted using unsafe, and oftentimes illegal
procedures, and are performed on poor and young women who are left without options (Casas
1997, 31).
Consequently, this chapter seeks to answer the questions: what is the history of abortion
law in Latin America and Chile, how have distinct societal actors affected these laws, and how
has this history influenced the current situation of the emergence of a black market for abortion
in Chile and in Latin America and the Caribbean? The purpose of this chapter within this thesis
is to provide a historical overview of abortion law in Chile, and to provide insights into why this
law is so restrictive, as a means of highlighting the reasons why the black market for Misoprostol
has emerged in Chile and Latin America, and why its creation has been so influential for the
women who attempt to access it. This chapter traces the history of abortion law from its
conception to its current status in Chile and in countries in LAC, to demonstrate the origins and
evolutions of this restrictive policy, and to provide a background and logic for the emergence of
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black markets for abortion in Chile, and the need to regulate these illegal spaces. Consequently,
this chapter begins by discussing early abortion law and health codes in the Latin America, as a
basis for the restrictiveness of abortion laws that would follow. The second section focuses on
abortion law and women’s movements in Latin America during the 1990s and 2000s, which
pushed for greater reproductive rights. The third section discusses the role of the Catholic
Church on abortion law in Latin America, as one of the main reasons why Chile and countries in
LAC have had difficulty liberalizing their abortion laws. Motivated by the third section, the
fourth section of this chapter analyzes why Chile has been met with challenges in liberalizing its
abortion law, leading to the creation of black markets for abortion. Finally, this chapter ends by
discussing the current status of abortion law in Latin America, to demonstrate the development
of these laws over time.

Early Abortion Law in Latin America
The first criminal codes in Latin America were modeled after the 1804 Napoleonic Code,
which detailed family relationships in the Anglo-American world (Htun 2003, 46). This code had
two major implications for the societal roles of men and women: men’s marital power, which
gave a man control over the household and his wife’s “person and property,” and “women’s
incapacity,” which forbade women from exercising their rights without their husbands’ approval
(Htun 2003, 47). These legal restrictions on women were further influenced by Christian doctrine
and Canon law, which were the first legal documents where abortion was criminalized and
deemed as homicide (Htun 2003, 53). Canon law influenced the criminal codes adopted
throughout Europe, and the first criminal code that was created in Latin America (which was
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adopted by Brazil in 1830, and punished women and doctors who attempted to perform
abortions) (Htun 2003, 54-55).
Chile’s first criminal code was created in 1875, and was related to crimes against families
and “public morality.” This code criminalized the “malicious” performance of abortion, a
framing of the issue that demonstrated the Catholic Church’s strong influence on morality in
Chile (Ortero Ruiz 2013, 12). The criminal code punished both women and doctors who
performed abortion, and was echoed throughout many of the original criminal codes in Latin
America (such as Argentina’s and Brazil’s) (Htun 2003, 55). In the 1920s and 30s, a range of
circumstances where abortion would not be punished were introduced in Chile, such as in
Chile’s National Heath Code of 1931, which decriminalized abortion for therapeutic purposes
(Htun 2003, 56).
Latin American countries were among some of the first countries in the world to allow
abortion in the case of rape. This provision was largely a response to movements that called for
“compassionate abortion” following the rape of women by soldiers during WW1. These
modifications to the traditional Latin American criminal codes were influenced by the work of
the Spanish criminologist, Luis Jiménez de Asúa, and by ideas about eugenics and the necessity
of providing abortions for mentally ill women who had been raped (Htun 2003, 56). However,
military governments during the 1960s and 70s in Latin America, largely influenced by the
Catholic Church, further enforced the concepts of family values, morality, and motherhood, and
in some cases pushed back against the ideas of therapeutic and compassionate abortion (Htun
2003, 67). Overall, the original legal power-imbalances between men and women in Latin
America, which created the countries’ initial criminal codes, have continued to influence
women’s rights legislature and movements. Combined with a growing opposition from the
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Catholic Church to abortion, these power-imbalances have largely contributed to the difficulty of
reforming abortion laws in the 21 st century.

Reproductive Rights Movements During the 1990s and 2000s
The response to the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 80s in Latin America was a
watershed moment for women’s rights movements in the region. Many women had been part of
the protests to overthrow the region’s military dictators, such as the cacerolazos in Chile and the
women of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina. However, in the process they largely side-lined their
quests for women’s rights to focus on fighting for the return of democracy. By the 1990s, the
networks that had been created during the protests against the military dictatorships were again
used to demand equal rights for women. Women’s rights movements throughout the region
argued that equal rights for women were required for the re-establishment of meaningful
democracy in Latin America (Kane 2008, 363). These rights included controversial topics, all of
which were protested by the Catholic Church, such as the right to divorce, sexual orientation, and
abortion (Kane 2008, 363).
Furthermore, the reproductive rights movement of the 1990s was not only a regional
movement, but in fact was part of a larger global trend. This movement brought together a
variety of domestic and international organizations with the goal of improving reproductive
health worldwide and decriminalizing abortion (Htun 2003, 149). Reproductive rights were a
major focus of both the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, that was
held in Cairo, and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, that was held in Beijing.
During these conferences, for the first time unsafe abortion was addressed as an issue of public
health, instead of just an issue of morality (Kane 2008, 363). Although the UN plans of action
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that emerged from these conferences were not binding, the conferences themselves raised
awareness for reproductive rights, and legitimized the concept of reproductive rights as human
rights (Htun 2003, 150). Although these movements and conferences were influential in the
region for garnering support for the decriminalization of abortion, antiabortion reforms, largely
led by the Catholic Church, emerged as a powerful response (Htun 2003, 151).

The Catholic Church and Abortion in Countries in LAC
The Catholic Church has always been opposed to certain social issues including divorce,
abortion, and contraception (Kane 2008, 363). In 1989, Pope Pius IX declared all forms of
abortion to be immoral, and banned the practice for Catholics. He made the opposition to
abortion one of the Church’s key focuses for both his reign, and for his predecessor’s, Pope John
Paul II (1978-2005) (Blofied 2008, 400). With Pope John Paul II’s reform of the Roman Catholic
Church in 1978, he took a hard stand against abortion, contraception, and divorce. He
particularly focused his efforts in Latin America, in the efforts to counter liberation theology. He
was able to influence the Church in Latin America by appointing conservative bishops to many
positions throughout the region (Htun 2003, 151). Following the return to democracy in Latin
America, anti-abortion activists and Catholic Church leaders used the same democracypromoting framework as abortion activists, but argued that in order to uphold human rights and
democracy, Latin American countries were required to protect the lives of innocent fetuses, and
forbid abortion. This rhetoric of the “right to life” was particularly effective, given Latin
America’s experience with brutal dictators and authoritarianism. Consequently, few politicians
have felt comfortable advocating for the decriminalization of abortion (Htun 152, 2003).
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The Church is able to influence public policy on abortion in Latin America through two
different means: indirect and direct pressure. The state uses indirect pressures through its moral
power and legitimacy. The Catholic Church is the most respected institution in many Latin
American countries, and therefore, its bishops and their opinions are respected as well.
According to a Latinobarómetro poll conducted in 2004, 71% of citizens stated that they had
confidence in the Church, while 37% said that they had confidence in the president, and only
18% expressed confidence in political parties (Htun 2009, 336-7). As a result, the Catholic
Church has been able to use its moral legitimacy to label politicians as immoral, thereby
damaging their reputations and their electoral support (Htun 2009, 353). For example, one
Argentine senator who sponsored a bill for the legalization of abortion lamented “no one has
demonstrated interest in considering this bill. It is an impolitic issue for the political environment
of our country” (Htun 2009, 344). In this way, the Catholic Church has almost an indirect veto
over public policy, and can inhibit the liberalization of politicians’ views and public statements
(Htun 2009, 338).
In a more direct way, in some conservative countries in LAC, such as Chile, the Catholic
Church has an influence in public policy through Christian Democrat and right-wing parties. In
some conservative Latin American countries, the Christian Democrats hold a large amount of
influence in government, and many believe that the positions of the party should reflect the
teachings of the Church (given the Christian Democrats’ philosophical and historical links to the
Catholic Church). Many find in the Catholic Church’s doctrine “a legitimating discourse for their
rejection of reform proposals” in areas such as abortion reform and divorce (Blofied and Haas
2005, 46-7). Following Pope John Paul II’s reform of the Catholic Church, that shifted the
Church towards a focus on hierarchy, a large amount of pressure was placed on the Christian
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Democrats to push back against reform in areas where the church has moral legitimacy, such as
abortion (Blofield and Haas 2005, 39). Additionally, some members of the conservative right in
Latin America also oppose reform that threatens the teachings of the Catholic Church.
Consequently, the influence of the Church on these two key parties has made liberalizing or
decriminalizing abortion difficult in countries where the Church has historically held large
amounts of power and moral legitimacy.
In Latin America, the Church has also had support in the antiabortion movement from
international activists and evangelical Protestant Christians. The growth of an international
conservative movement emerged in response to the decisions made in Cairo and Beijing, the
increased centralization of the Catholic Church through Pope John Paul’s reforms, and as a
reaction to the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision of Roe vs. Wade. The Catholic
Church and conservative activists saw the UN conferences and the legalization of elective
abortion in the U.S as assaults on motherhood, Church doctrine, and the sanctity of human life
(Htun 2003, 150-51). Antiabortion activists sought to stop the inclusion of any clauses related to
abortion in the final UN documents from the two conferences. The international conservative
movement also helped some domestic movements in Latin America in their framing of their antiabortion agenda (Htun 2009, 340). Although some Catholic organizations, such as Católicas por
el Derecho a Decidir (Catholics for a Free Choice), have emerged as a movement of
transnational organizations that support liberalizing abortion on the basis of Catholic theology,
the majority of Catholic transnational organizations are strongly against reform (Htun 2009,
339). Additionally, although evangelical Protestants pose a threat to the hegemony of the
Catholic Church, they have also joined with the Church in the region-wide fight against the
legalization of abortion (Kane 2008, 364).

32

Overall, the Catholic Church has played a large role in determining the outcome of
abortion legislation in countries in LAC where the Church has a significant amount of influence
in government, such as in Chile. The next section will build off this section’s discussion of the
influence of the Catholic Church on abortion law in LAC, to analyze the reasons why abortion
law has been so difficult to liberalize in Chile, and why these difficulties have led to the
emergence of a thriving black market for abortion and Misoprostol in Chile.

Why Abortion Law Has Been Difficult to Liberalize in Chile
In Chile, therapeutic abortion was legal between 1931 and 1989. The 1931 Health Code
allowed abortion to save the life or health of a woman (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 71). However,
before leaving office, in 1989 General Augusto Pinochet included a “right-to-life” clause in the
Constitution that stated that “Every person has a right to life, and the law will protect the life of
the unborn” (Casas-Becerra 1997, 29). Some argue that this clause was introduced as part of
Pinochet’s policies of supporting population growth, while others believe that he outlawed
therapeutic abortion as a means of spiting the women’s movements that had protested his reign
during the 1960s and 70s (Casas-Becerra 1997, 29; Stevenson 2012, 139). The abortion debate in
Pinochet’s office began in 1974, during the time when Pinochet’s government commission was
meeting to draft a new Constitution. One of the conservative members of the commission, Jaime
Guzmán, was vehemently opposed to therapeutic abortion and believed that it should be
outlawed before the return to democracy (Casas-Becerra 1997, 29). Since 1989, the Criminal
Code on abortion has not been reformed, despite various efforts by women’s rights organizations
and legislators to create support for the movement (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 72).
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However, until 2006 only one proposal had been introduced to Congress to decriminalize
abortion (which do not pass). Furthermore, in 2006, and twice in 2009, proposals were presented
to Congress that sought to legalize abortion. None of these proposals were seriously debated
(Stevenson 2012, 140). Scholars argue that there are two main reasons why it has been so
difficult to liberalize abortion policies in Chile, and why therapeutic abortion is still illegal in a
country that views itself in many cases as highly westernized and progressive. First, the Catholic
Church has successfully been able to oppose efforts for the decriminalization of abortion,
primarily through parties in government and through the strength of its organizations. Second,
women’s rights organizations in Chile have been unable to create a unified force in support of
the decriminalization of abortion, encouraging President Michele Bachelet, during her first term,
to focus her efforts on the slightly less controversial issue of emergency contraception.
Scholars argue that the first reason why efforts to liberalize abortion have largely failed in
Chile is that the Catholic Church has traditionally had a significant influence over public policy
and public opinion. The Church has the direct ability to influence the decisions of Congress
through public sermons, personal ties with congressman, and moral legitimacy. In Chile, the
right in Congress, specifically the UDI and the RN, and members of the PDC (the Christian
Democrats) have strong ties to the Catholic Church, and hold significant sway in Congress (Haas
2010, 70). Between 1990 and 2000, the PDC was the largest party in Congress and controlled the
presidency. Furthermore, since 1973, the political and monetary power of the economic elite (as
represented by the right in Congress) has continued to grow (Blofield and Haas 2005, 40).
Consequently, these groups (largely influenced by the Catholic Church) have been very
successful at stymieing any reform of the abortion law in Chile.
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In Chile, the main opposition groups to abortion, which are allied with the Catholic
Church, are the Legionarios de Cristo (the Legion of Christ) and Opus Dei. These two
organizations have been extremely effective in their campaigns against abortion and emergency
contraception, and have exercised a large amount of control over mass media. Furthermore, they
have been successful at framing issues of reproductive rights as “moral issues,” which has played
a large role in swaying public opinion away from the liberalization of abortion laws (Peña et al.
2012, 152). Blofield and Haas have argued that bills that are framed as “moral” or “rights-based”
have traditionally been very difficult to pass in Chile. “Rights-based” bills seek to give women
more individual rights, such as the right to reproductive health and abortion, whereas “rolesbased” bills are less controversial because they do not threaten the traditional family structure, or
the role of a woman within that structure (such as bills that criminalize violence against women)
(Blofield and Haas 2005, 37). Consequently, the expression of the Catholic Church, through
political parties and pro-life organizations, has played a large role in stopping both reform and
debate in Congress around issues of abortion and reproductive rights.
The second reason that scholars argue has made the liberalization of abortion laws
particularly difficult in Chile is the relative weakness of women’s rights organizations, and their
lack of unity proceeding the return to democracy in Chile. Although many women’s rights
organizations in Chile have fought hard to support therapeutic abortion, their efforts have been
eclipsed by the financial and numerical strength of oppositional, pro-life organizations. For
example, in 1999 there were twenty-one women’s rights NGOs in Chile, whereas during the
same time period, Opus Dei alone supported seventy private foundations that all had the mission
of opposing the liberalization of abortion laws (Peña et al. 2012, 153). Consequently, women’s
rights organization have had difficulties in providing enough pressure on the government, in
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comparison to opposition groups, to influence government debate and decisions about abortion
law in Chile. Secondly, women’s rights organizations have been unable to effectively pressure
the government for change because following re-democratization, they were no longer unified
for a singular goal, began competing amongst each other, and had difficulties re-defining their
missions. As a result, these organizations have been unable to create a diverse coalition in
support of the liberalization of abortion, have acted more like interest groups than social
movements, and have struggled to gain support from a wide range of societal actors for issues of
women’s rights (Tobar 2003, 274).
Consequently, in response to the strength of the opposition and the relative weakness of
women’s rights organizations, during her first term in the presidency, Bachelet decided to put the
issue of abortion on hold. Instead, Bachelet focused her efforts on the slightly less controversial
issue of access to the morning after pill. During this time period, Bachelet was careful not to
publicize her own opinion about abortion, in the efforts to maintain support for her bill. This lack
of support for abortion reform angered many women’s rights organizations, who had hoped to
see Bachelet as their champion of the issue. However, through Bachelet’s efforts, in 2010 the
Emergency Contraception and Sex Education law was passed, allowing access to emergency
contraception to all women (Stevenson 2012, 140). During her second term, Bachelet has made
the legalization of therapeutic abortion a priority on her agenda. With this large degree of
presidential support for the issue, it is possible that the current bill pending in Congress (which
calls for the decriminalization of therapeutic abortion) may gain traction where similar bills have
failed (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 70). Overall, Chile’s history of a strong Church influence in
politics, and relatively weak women’s rights organizations, following the return to democracy,
has made abortion reform especially difficult.
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Due to the reasons described above, Chilean law has made it impossible for women to
legally abort under any circumstances. However, this illegality has created a space for illegal
markets to emerge to meet this relatively large, unmet societal need for abortions in Chile.
Studies have found that making abortion illegal does not reduce the rate of abortions; rather, it
forces abortions “underground,” and encourages women to abort using increasingly unsafe
methods. Because it has been so difficult to reform abortion laws in Chile, based on Chile’s
experiences with restrictive abortion law, the dictatorship, and the Catholic Church’s strong
influence, we have seen the emergence of a thriving black market for abortion and Misoprostol
in Chile, resulting in an increasing “need” to regulate this illegal activity. Having described the
reasons why it has been difficult to liberalize abortion laws in Chile, I will now discuss the
current situation of abortion law in countries in LAC, to demonstrate how these laws have
evolved overtime throughout the region, and how black markets have emerged to fill societal
demand where they have not.

The Current Status of Abortion and Abortion Law in Latin America and the Caribbean
The current status of abortion law in countries in LAC is that overall, elective abortion
(the United States’ current abortion policy) is prohibited in the vast majority of these countries.
Cuba, French Guiana, and Guyana are the only countries in the region that allow abortion
without restrictions during the first trimester of pregnancy. On the other end of the spectrum,
Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Nicaragua do not allow abortion under any
circumstances. The majority of countries in LAC fall in the middle of this spectrum: they permit
abortion in “therapeutic cases” meaning cases where the mother’s life or health is at risk, in cases
of rape or incest, or in cases of fetal abnormalities. Additionally, in Argentina, a mentally ill
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woman who has been raped may seek an abortion, and in a few countries in LAC (such as
Venezuela) if a woman seeks an abortion on the grounds of maintaining her honor or the honor
of a family member, she may be subject to less harsh penalties. Finally, the countries of
Barbados, Belize, and Saint Vincent and Grenadines allow abortion on the basis of
socioeconomic and health grounds (Kulczycki 2011, 206-7). For a full summary of the status of
abortion in all countries in LAC, see Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Legality of Abortion in Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016
Reason

Countries

Prohibited altogether, or no explicit legal
exception to save the life of a woman
To save the life of a woman

Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Surinam
Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Dominica,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay,
Venezuela
Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Grenada, Peru
Colombia, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St.
Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago
Barbados, Belize, St. Vincent and Grenadines

To preserve physical health (and save a
woman’s life)
To preserve mental health (and all above
reasons)
Socioeconomic reasons (and all above
reasons)
Without restriction as to reason

Cuba, Guyana, Puerto Rico, Uruguay

Source: Kulczycki, A. (2011). Abortion in Latin America: Changes in Practice, Growing Conflict, and Recent
Policy Developments. Studies in Family Planning, 42(3), 199-220.

Since the creation of their penal codes, few countries in Latin America have loosened or
changed their abortion laws (Htun 2009, 349). However, there are two cases where abortion laws
have been liberalized in Latin America: Mexico City and Colombia. Up until 2011, Mexico City
had some of the strictest abortion policies in Mexico; abortion was only allowed in therapeutic
cases. However, in 2007, Mexico City’s legislative assembly legalized elective abortion during
the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and in 2008, the Supreme Court approved the
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constitutionality of this law (Madrazo 2009, 266). This legislation was the culmination of
decades of work and legal reforms by women’s rights organizations, beginning with Ley Robles
in 2000, which increased the number of legal exceptions to the full criminalization of abortion
(Kane 2008, 367; Madrazo 2009, 266).
The case of the liberalization of abortion laws in Colombia followed similar patterns to
those in Mexico City. In 2005, a lawyer named Monica Roa petitioned the Constitutional Court
to review the article of the Colombian Penal Code that criminalized abortion in all cases. Similar
to the Mexico City case, there was extreme pressure from the Catholic Church against
decriminalization (Kane 2008, 367). Since 1975, five bills had been presented and subsequently
vetoed that all attempted to address issues of unsafe abortion and decriminalization (Amando et
al. 2016, 119). However, Roa’s bill gained traction because she was able to build a large
coalition, including healthcare officials and international organizations (such as Women’s Link
International) who were in favor of decriminalization. Consequently, in 2006, Colombian
abortion law changed from a complete ban on abortion to the legality of therapeutic abortion.
(Kane 2008, 366). The two cases of Mexico City and Colombia demonstrate that even in
contexts where the Catholic Church has a large amount of influence, it is possible for countries
to liberalize their abortion laws if the situation is ripe for reform. Having described the current
situation of abortion law in countries in LAC, I will now provide an outline of the current status
of abortion in these countries, as a response to the restrictiveness of abortion law within the
majority of them.
The current status of abortion in countries in LAC is that there has been a consistent
decline in abortion rates, largely due to increased access to contraception throughout the region.
Between 1990 and 2008, abortion rates in Latin America were estimated to have declined from
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45 to 31 abortions per 1,000 women. However, this rate is still much higher than in most
European countries where contraceptives are more accessible, and abortion is legalized
(Kulczycki 2011, 203). Although the rate of abortion in Latin American continues to decrease,
there is still a high rate of deaths from unsafe abortions in the region, at about 1,100 deaths per
year (Kulczycki 2011, 204). Furthermore, poor women disproportionality suffer more in Latin
America than wealthy women due to the illegality of abortion, as they are unable to pay for the
abortion procedure to be conducted in safe clinics (where wealthy women are able to access
care), and instead must resort to unregulated and unsafe methods (Htun 2009, 342).
The introduction of Misoprostol to the region, and in many cases, the creation of a black
market for this medication, has reduced the number of deaths and complications due to abortion.
For example, in the Dominican Republic the introduction of Misoprostol decreased the rate of
severe complications related to abortion by 75%. However, mortality rates from abortion are
higher in the Caribbean (80 per 100,000) than in South and Central America, largely due to the
fact that women in the Caribbean often must resort to unsafe methods to perform abortion, and
have decreased access to post-abortion care. Furthermore, although most Latin American
countries have passed laws to ensure access to emergency contraceptive care, seven out of
seventeen countries in the region cite critical availability problems. Additionally, even in
countries where abortion is legalized in limited circumstances, there are few countries that have
hospital protocols to ensure the quality of abortion and post-abortion care (Kulczycki 2011, 205).
This inequality in access to care between poor and rich women, and between poor and
wealthy countries, in addition to the lack of accountability and safety of abortion procedures,
creates an environment where women are unable to achieve their rights to health and
reproductive care. However, one of the results of the formation of the black market for abortion

40

in Chile, in response to the highly restrictive nature of Chile’s abortion laws, is that it has
reduced some of this inequality, making abortions more accessible to a wider sector of the
population. But, a growth in the black market has also produced an increase in the visibility of
this market, and the expectation of increased regulatory action against this illegal activity.
Consequently, Chapter 3 of this thesis will describe the creation of different types of black
markets for abortion in Chile, while Chapters 4, 5, and 6 will describe how the regulation of this
market occurs.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the history of abortion law in Latin
America, from its beginnings and influences by European criminal codes, to various reforms to
these codes following WW1, to further reforms following the return to democracy and the
growing power of women’s rights organizations. I described the historical role of the Catholic
Church in Latin America, and the ways in which it has influenced abortion law. Next, I
highlighted the history and origins of abortion legislation in Chile, and discussed the reasons
why it has been so difficult to liberalize abortion in Chile: the strength of the opposition and the
weakness of the proponents. Finally, I provided a summary of the current status of abortion laws
and abortion in countries in LAC. This historical chapter sought to provide a timeline of abortion
laws from conception, to evolution, to current day, as a means of demonstrating why many of the
abortion laws in countries in LAC, such as Chile, are so restrictive, and why black markets have
emerged as a response. In the next chapter, I provide a description of the three types of black
markets for abortion, and seek to answer the question, what is the structure of the black market
for abortion in Chile, and how does it function?
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CHAPTER 3: WHAT IS THE STRUCTURE OF THE BLACK MARKET FOR
MISOPROSTOL IN CHILE, AND HOW DOES IT FUNCTION?

The black market for Misoprostol in Chile is fairly visible, but rarely studied. Although
the majority of Chileans recognize that this market exists, and in most cases know how and
where to access Misoprostol, very few studies and publications acknowledge its existence. As a
result, one of the purposes of this chapter is to make this black market more visible, as a means
of engaging with some of the academic debates surrounding black markets. One of the
consequences of the lack of academic literature about this market is that this chapter primarily
uses interviews and primary sources to chronicle the components of black market for abortion in
Chile. In this chapter, I seek to answer the question: what is the structure of the black market for
abortion Chile, and how does it function? In answering this question, I will be creating a context
for discussing both the formal and informal regulation of each of the different aspects of the
black market, which make up Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this thesis.
In responding to this question, I first highlight literature about the forms that black
markets can take, and the function that they provide for society, as a way of situating the
different types of black markets for abortion in Chile within a larger scholarly debate. I next
break this chapter into three different parts, based on the three different types of black markets in
Chile. The first type of black market for abortion in Chile is the traditional black market, which
is fueled by online websites and transactions that occur in Chile’s metro systems. This traditional
black market can also be broken into two parts. The first part of this market is profit-driven and
dominated by men, whose main motivation for selling Misoprostol is to make money. The
second part of this traditional market is run by medical professionals and individuals whose
motivation for selling the drug is not only to make a profit, but also to supply women with a safe
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means of aborting. The second type of black market for Misoprostol in Chile, which some refer
to as “the parallel market,” is run by local and international feminist NGOs. These NGOs include
Women Help Women and Women on Web, and seek to provide women with access to
contraceptives and abortive drugs, as well as medical consultations, accompaniment, and
accurate information about reproductive health. Finally, the third type of black market for
abortion in Chile is fueled by wealthy women, and is broken down into private clinics in Chile,
and in travel to hospitals in other countries where abortion is more accessible. This third type of
black market drives a large amount of the inequality in access to care in Chile. In detailing these
three different types of black markets, I also respond to the questions: how is each type of market
accessed, who/what drives each market, and how do these transactions occur?

Literature Review of Black Markets.
There are multiple theories about black markets, and about different forms that black
markets can take, different actors involved in these markets, and different motivations that drives
these actors. The first type of black market that scholars have engaged with is an illegal activity
that I have identified as the “traditional black market.” The traditional black market is
characterized by the fact that it functions through underground transactions, occasionally
operating through the internet, and involves individuals who are typically viewed as “criminals,”
such as gang members. There is a variety of scholarly work that discusses the presence and
impact of traditional black markets on society. Traditional black markets can take on a variety of
forms, from illegal drug trafficking to illegal trade in body parts, but these markets all share the
characteristic of having high rates of return, and are conducted with the sole purpose of acquiring
large amounts of capital, no matter the impact on society (Naylor 2002, 16). However, I have
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also identified a second type of this “traditional” black market, which still functions in the way
that traditional black market operations occur (ex: through transactions on the internet and in
metro stations), but the sole purpose of this market is not just money-making, it also has the
purpose of making Misoprostol more accessible to Chilean women.
The second camp of literature about the purpose and form of black markets is that in
some cases, they can provide important services to society, and are run for this purpose.
Literature on black markets discusses certain societal benefits that black markets can provide.
Rosen argues that “under certain conditions, the existence of an underground economy raises
social welfare,” and other scholars have argued that black markets can provide economic
opportunities to poor sectors of the population (Rosen 2005, 353; Castellas and Portes 2006, 33).
Similarly, the second type of black market for Misoprostol in Chile that I identified was the
parallel black market. The “parallel market” is a concept that I developed from one of my
interviews. During our interview, Maria José argued that individuals who engage in this market,
international and local NGOs, do not view their work in providing women with medications as
illegal activity, and do not associate themselves with the traditional black market; rather, they
engage in this activity with the sole purpose of making Misoprostol more accessible to women
who need it (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017).
The most comparable black market to the parallel market for Misoprostol in Chile is the
black market for prescription drugs or pain killers, which can also provide a societal good.
Grzybowski argues that black markets can have a moral component “which seeks to meet a
human need” (Grybowski 2004, 28). For example, in cases of antiretroviral drugs, because they
are so expensive, a black market has emerged to supply developing countries with high-quality,
affordable antiretroviral drugs to combat HIV/AIDs (Grybowski 2004, 28). The parallel market
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for Misoprostol is similar in the way that it is also motivated by seeking to meet a human need,
but is distinct in the actors involved (NGOs versus drug companies).
Finally, literature suggests that a third type of black market is illegal activity driven by
public officials, with the motivation of making money. Scholars have argued that in some cases,
public officials may be co-opted into being involved in illegal activity, such as an illegal drug
trade, with the purpose of making large profits (Gill 2002, 537). Comparably, in Chile, the
private market for abortion is run by doctors in private hospitals. This type of black market is
fairly unique to the case of abortion, as it entails healthcare professionals’ provision of an illegal
medical service to women, generally for a high price. However, in both of these cases, wellrespected members in society, doctors and government officials, are becoming involved in an
illegal activity, motivated by profit. However, the provision of an illegal medical service is quite
different than government officials’ involvement in an illegal drug trade, and therefore, this
element of the black market can provide insight into other, unexpected, arenas where black
markets can function. Having engaged with the scholarly debate about the different forms that
black markets can take, the different actors involved in these markets, and the different
consequences of the presence of these markets on society, I will now break down the black
market for abortion in Chile into its three types: the traditional black market, the parallel market,
and the private market.

Type 1: The Traditional Black Market
The traditional black market for Misoprostol in Chile is based on access through
websites, word of mouth, and posts on college forums. The traditional black market is
“traditional” because it is run in a way more associated with a traditional black market, as it
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involves sellers who carry the medications across the border into the country, and engage in
monetary transactions in public places with the women who seek to access these medications.
This market is primarily run through the internet and WhatsApp. Furthermore, this traditional
black market can be broken down into two parts, based on sellers’ motivations within this
market, and the types of actors involved in these transactions. The first part of the traditional
black market is dominated by men who are motivated by money, and therefore sell Misoprostol
for a commercial focus. The second part of the traditional black market is dominated by medical
professionals and individuals, whose motivation is to provide women with access to abortive
drugs (as a means of giving them agency).

Profit-motivated
The first part of this traditional market is described by a woman from Con las Amigas y
en la Casa, an NGO that runs a hotline that responds to questions about abortions, and works to
provide women with information about Misoprostol and the process of aborting with this drug:
It seems that it’s a very attractive market. Today, one of the characteristics of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile is that it’s a market run by men, the majority who don’t
have any notion of a responsibility for the sale of the drug; rather, they do it to get an
economic dividend. Because of this, they speculate with the price of the drug. We know
of cases where women have paid a lot for one dose, about two-hundred dollars, for an
abortion that’s not even guaranteed because the seller doesn’t make any promise with the
sale (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017).

This part of the black market can be lucrative because men are essentially able to charge
whatever price they want for the drug, and they will always be able to find women who will pay,
or are ignorant of the true worth of the medications. For example, the documentary La Línea de
Aborto, which was created over a period of years starting in 2008 in response to a surge in these
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types of hotlines, shows an interview with a man who sold Misoprostol on the black market in
Chile (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017). In the interview, the man describes how
he began the lucrative business of selling Misoprostol on the black market:

Six or seven years ago I started doing this because I had the need to buy pills because my
girlfriend at the time was pregnant. And after, I realized that it was a good alterative way
of getting an income. And from that date, I have spent six or seven years selling
Misoprostol (Rist and Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016).

The man in this interview then goes on to describe how the only way that he is able to
access this drug is by purchasing it abroad in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, or Paraguay, and bringing
it back into the country. He also states that for the trip to be worth it, he needs to bring back at
least sixty packets, or 210 doses. By selling each dose for 50,000 Chilean pesos (or $77), a fairly
inexpensive price, he is able to make a profit of 10,500,000 Chilean pesos (or $16,338). Many of
the men who dominate this traditional market advertise their sale of the drug by spraying their
WhatsApp number on buildings, particularly in front of schools and universities (Rist and
Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016). In this way, some Chilean academics have argued that there
are two types of this traditional black market, one which is visible (such as the online websites
for Misoprostol) and one which is more invisible. This “invisible” market is based on these male
sellers, whose products are often advertised by women themselves “boca a boca” (from mouth to
mouth), which is generally the more dangerous type of the traditional market because it does not
guarantee the quality of the drug (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).

Access-driven
The second part of the traditional black market for Misoprostol has less of a purely
economic motivation, and instead, is driven more by medical professionals and individuals who
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seek to provide women with the opportunity to abort using a safer approach (as opposed to more
traditional methods which have higher risks of complications). In an interview with a member of
Women Help Women, an organization that provides women in Chile, and worldwide, with
Misoprostol, contraceptives, and access to reproductive health information, I was told that in
relation to this second part of the traditional black market: “Yes, we know that there are doctors
and medical personal that sell and facilitate the access to Misoprostol” (Author Interview with
Anonymous, February 14, 2017).
This online aspect of the traditional black market for Misoprostol is very visible and wellknown throughout Chile. Dr. Ramiro Molina, a professor at la Universidad de Chile and a
gynecologist/obstetrician told me in an interview:
You put “Misotrol” in the web page, and you see that there are twenty pages. And they
say where one can find it and where it is. And the metro station in Santiago is a good
mechanism for selling Misotrol (Author Interview with Molina, January 13, 2017).

In this way, Misoprostol is very easy to access within Santiago, and its sale is driven by
commercial interactions within metro stations throughout the city. As part of his research on the
black market for Misoprostol in Chile, Nicolas Perez, a student of bioethics at la Universidad de
Desarollo, along with Dr. Juan Pablo Beca (the founder of the Center of Bioethics at the
university) were curious about how these online websites functioned, and how many women
were accessing medications through these websites. Consequently, they sent an email to one of
the websites, vendomisoprostol.com to discover more about the process: “In fourteen hours, we
already had the contact, and the only thing left to do was to make the bank transaction, in order
to get the pills in a metro station” (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).
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Furthermore, Perez stated that this was only one of twenty websites, and that the majority
of these pages were associated with medical professionals, such as paramedics, technicians, and
midwives (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017). In searching “Misotrol en Chile”
(Misoprostol in Chile), I also found at least twenty formal websites that sold Misoprostol, along
with a long list of WhatsApp numbers from people who claimed to sell the drug. The most
popular of these websites were “vendomistrol,” “Misotrol Chile,” and “Venta Misotrol Chile.”1
“Vendomistrol” is an example of how the majority of these websites, that seek to provide women
with access and information to these safer means of aborting, functions (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Image of Website vendomisotrol.com

Source: 2016. Vendomistrol. Retrieved from http://vendomisotrol.com/. Last accessed: 4/27/17.

The mission statement of “vendomistrol” is:

1

https://www.vendomisotrol.com, https://www.misotrolchile.com/, and
http://www.vendomisotrol.cl/ (last accessed 4/27/17).
49

This webpage is the response to all of the incorrect information that one can find on the
Internet with respect to the application of said method. We are worried by the ignorance
that exists about this and the application of unsafe methods that can harm women’s
health. It’s because of this that our work is to collect information with solid foundations,
in order to benefit those people that have chosen to make this important decision
(venomisotrol.com, last accessed 4/27/17).
From this webpage, it is clear that the seller’s motivation for creating the website was not
only economical, but also has the purpose of combating some of the false information and
medications that are present within the traditional black market in Chile. Although these actors
are motivated by money, money is not their only incentive for selling Misoprostol. Many of the
owners of the websites are healthcare professionals who understand that the black market
involves large amounts of incorrect and potentially dangerous information (which will be
described in greater detail in Chapter 6), and therefore, they also sell Misoprostol as a way of
providing women with a safer, more reliable access to this medication.
On this webpage, one can purchase a combination of four pills of Misoprostol and six of
Mifepristone for the cost of 60,000 Chilean pesos, or $94. As the founders of pages like these are
very aware of the high numbers of fake drugs sold online, they photograph the packets before
sending them to different regions throughout Chile (vendomisotrol.com, last accessed 4/27/17).
Because Chile is highly urbanized, the majority of the sellers of these medications are
located in big cities such as Santiago, Valparaíso, and Valdivia. However, the sellers also receive
requests, through the internet, from women in other regions of Chile, and will send the drugs
through Chilexpress (Western Union) (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).

Deliveries within Santiago are completely personalized and are done in the metro stations
that accommodate the client…the deliveries to regions are done through Chilexpress
(Western Union) after the delivery of the money on the client’s part, once the bank
transaction is verified we send the product to our clients. For greater security, we show
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the real photos of the product so that one can confirm that the product that will be sent
corresponds to the one that is offered (vendomisotrol.com, last accessed 4/27/17).

Although many websites sell a combination of Misoprostol and Mifepristone (because
this combination is more effective than solely taking Misoprostol), Mifepristone is more difficult
to obtain from pharmacies in other countries in Latin America. This is the case because
Misoprostol is more widely proliferated, due to its classification as an ulcer-reducing drug, while
Mifepristone is essentially only associated with abortions, and is therefore prohibited in many
Latin American countries (Author Interview with Zegers, January 17, 2017). Consequently,
organizations such as Línea de Aborto Libre and Con las Amigas y en la Casa only provide
Chilean women with information about the use of Misoprostol, because the majority of
Mifepristone on the black market is fake. However, Angel Erpel argues that recently,
Mifepristone has become more easy to obtain, and is becoming more widespread on the black
market (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017). Furthermore, some sellers scam women
into buying “uterine protectors” (which are a type of antibiotic) with their purchase of
Misoprostol, although they are completely unnecessary (Author Interview with Anonymous,
February 14, 2017).
One of the most difficult elements of my field research was attempting to discover where
the majority of the Misoprostol that was entering the traditional black market was coming from,
as most Chileans know that the market for Misoprostol exists, but they do not know how it enters
the country. The consensus from my informants was that most of the medications came from
Peru (and some other Latin American countries), and that some likely came from hospitals, since
hospitals are the only institution in Chile that can legally buy Misoprostol. In response to this
prompt, Dr. Ramiro Molina stated:

51

And in fact, in the majority of countries, Misoprostol is sold on the open market in all of
the pharmacies. In fact, Peru. The quantity of Misoprostol that exists in Chile comes from
what’s bought in northern Chile from Peru, in Tacna. And Tacna is one of the biggest
sellers, and the best clients are Chileans that bring it and put it in the black market
(Author Interview with Molina, January 13, 2017).

Although the majority of the Misoprostol that enters the black market in Chile comes
from Peru, some enters from other Latin American countries where it can also be bought fairly
easily, such as Bolivia (under the name Cytotec) and Argentina (under the name Oxaprost)
(Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017). Finally, because this part of the traditional
market for Misoprostol is internet-based, and often advertises through college forums, most
Chilean women who access it tend to have slightly higher levels of education and incomes.
In general all types of women abort, there isn’t a profile. But, specifically with
Misoprostol, because of the idea of access to information, in general it’s younger women
that use it…but also women with a higher level of education. This has been a big
challenge because poor women still abort with catheters, curettage, and with other
methods. So in general, the women that abort with Misoprostol have access to
information and they have access to the internet (Author Interview with Erpel, January
25, 2017).

Having described the traditional black market for Misoprostol, detailing both the profitdriven side, and the internet-based, access-driven side, and having answered the questions of
where the medication comes from, how women get access to the medication, who is selling and
using it, and how the transaction takes place, I will now move on to describe the second type of
black market for Misoprostol in Chile: the “parallel market,” that is run by local and international
nonprofit organizations.
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Type 2: The Parallel Market
The “parallel market” for Misoprostol, as one member of Women Help Women (WHW)
preferred for it to be called, is run by local and international feminist nonprofit organizations that
believe that women have the right to access abortions. In Chile, these international organizations
make up a network with local nonprofit organizations, such as Línea Aborto Libre and Con las
Amigas y en la Casa, which only provide information to women about how to abort, but do not
give them the actual medications to do so. Furthermore, there are two main international
nonprofits that work in Chile (and around the world) to provide women with Misoprostol:
Women Help Women and Women on Web.

Women Help Women (WHW)
Women Help Women is an international organization with the vision that “the key to
women’s autonomy is putting contraception and abortion directly in women’s hands,” and the
motto that “when the government fails, women help other women get abortions they need” (2016
Women Help Women Annual Report 2016, 1). WHW was founded on September 28, 2014, and
is based in sixteen countries on four different continents. WHW has a staff of twenty-six
counselors and doctors that work as community leaders and educators in these countries. WHW
conducts its work by partnering with activists and community health workers, and by using
online services to provide women around the world with access to abortion and contraceptive
medications. WHW also runs a multilingual information and counseling center, which functions
sixteen hours a day and provides counseling in Portuguese, English, Polish, Spanish, Italian, and
Thai. In 2016 alone, WHW received more than 60,000 emails, and worked with forty partner
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organizations to provide 40,000 medical abortions around the world (2016 Women Help Women
Annual Report 2016, 2).
Women Help Women facilitates women’s access to safe abortions and provides them
with information, and also with the medication. What we do as a group of women is to
respond to emails in distinct languages…my job is to respond to emails and questions
from women that want to abort, are in the process of aborting, or after they have
aborted…also we give information about sexual and reproductive education in general.
And, we have a group of doctors that provides consultations if there is a case that requires
more medical information (Author Interview with Anonymous, February 14, 2017).

In Latin America, WHW works in five countries where access to safe abortions is
restricted: Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Venezuela. In these five
countries, WHW trained 350 activists as “information providers, hotline operators, or community
abortion doulas” (2016 Women Help Women Annual Report 2016, 2). Since 2014, WHW has
reached at least 50,000 women with unwanted pregnancies (2016 Women Help Women Annual
Report 2016, 2). In Chile specifically, WHW has two employees; one that is based in Santiago
the other in the south of Chile, that partner with local organizations: “In Chile we are in an
alliance with feminist groups…we support the hotlines and help in creating some workshops and
publications. We work with la Línea de Aborto Libre, which is located in Santiago and Iquique”
(Author Interview with Anonymous, February 14, 2017).
WHW works in Chile by sending women medications for medical abortions (as a
combination of Misoprostol and Mifepristone), and contraceptives (including contraceptive pills,
emergency contraception, and condoms). To receive abortive medications from WHW, a woman
must be above the age of eighteen, be less than nine weeks pregnant, and have filled out an
online consultation (which is reviewed by WHW’s medical staff). As WHW is a nonprofit, it
asks for a contribution of 75 euros for the combination of Misoprostol and Mifepristone ($80 or
51,233 Chilean pesos), but it makes accommodations for women who are unable to pay
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(https://womenhelp.org/., last accessed 4/27/17). Finally, WHW sends the medications to women
through the mail:
A discrete package will be sent as soon as possible. You will receive a tracking number
to follow your shipment online within 3 business days. In most countries, you are allowed
to receive medicines for your own use. The package is expected to arrive within 4-10
days, depending on your location… Access to the content or service may not be legal by
certain persons or in certain countries. If you access the Website you do so at your own
risk and are responsible for compliance with the laws of your jurisdiction
(https://womenhelp.org/., last accessed 4/27/17).

By sending packages through the mail, WHW is able to reach women all throughout
Chile in a fairly short period of time. However, as stated above, women who access WHW’s
service “do so at their own risk,” and may be subject to prosecutions (https://womenhelp.org/.,
last accessed 4/27/17). However, this service provides women with access to accurate
information and reproductive health products that are safer (and more guaranteed) than those that
are available on the traditional black market in Chile, while promoting support for abortion and
women’s rights worldwide.

Women on Web and Women on Waves
Women on Web was created in 2005 by Rebecca Gomperts, the founder of the
organization Women on the Waves. Gomperts created Women on Waves in 1999 when she
realized that by using a Dutch-registered ship, that was therefore subject to Dutch law, she could
bring the ship to countries where abortion was illegal, take women on board the ship, sail to
international waters (twelve miles off the country’s coast), and legally provide them with
medical abortions. The Women on Waves ship has never travelled to Chile, but it has completed
successful campaigns in Poland, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Morocco, and this year will begin
a campaign in Guatemala (http://www.womenonwaves.org/, last accessed 4/27/17). As the ship
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cannot reach a large number of countries, Gomperts decided to created Women on Web (WoW),
in the efforts to provide medical abortions to more women worldwide.
WoW is a “telemedicine support service,” and an international collective that responds to
thousands of emails every day from all around the world. There are five physicians that work for
WoW worldwide. Women access WoW through their website, and are required to fill out an
online consultation before being sent a combination of Misoprostol and Mifepristone (which has
a 98% success rate). WoW only provides women with medical abortions if they live in a country
where access to safe abortion is restricted, if they have no serious illnesses, and if they are less
than ten weeks pregnant (http://www.womenonwaves.org/, last accessed 4/27/17). Women who
request the medications also receive consultations through email, during and after the procedure,
and are advised on how to access medical services to confirm that the abortion was successful or
if they experience complications (Larrea et. al 2015, 1). If women do experience complications,
WoW also counsels them on how to avoid criminal charges (Bazelon 2014). Since the website
was created in 2005 (twelve years ago), “over 200,000 women from over 140 countries have
completed the online consultation, approximately 50,000 women have received a medical
abortion at home, and the helpdesk has answered more than 600,000 emails” (Online abortion
service Women on Web is 10 years!, 2016). Furthermore, WoW is gaining popularity, and
currently every month the helpdesk answers 10,000 emails in sixteen languages, and the website
receives over one million visitors (Online abortion service Women on Web is 10 years!, 2016).
WoW provides women with the medications through its partnership with Kale Impex, an
India-based company (Bazelon 2014). Women who request medications through WoW are asked
for a 90-euro donation to pay for staff salaries and overhead, but if women are unable to afford
the drug, they are not required to pay (although 79% of women do make the full donation)
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(Larrea et al. 2015, 3). One study found that in 2014, of the 2,042 Latin American women that
requested medications through WoW, the majority lived in Brazil (68.9%), did not have children
(83.9%), had not had previous abortions (93.2%), and aborted before the 10th week of their
pregnancy (74.5%) (Larrea et. al 2015, 3). WoW provides free medical abortions to women with
Zika; however, Brazilian authorities have begun to crack down on packages sent to Brazilian
women from WoW. WoW reported that many Brazilian women had complained that customs
officials were confiscating their packages, and WoW was forced to recommend that women seek
help through other means, such as travelling to public clinics in Mexico City (which is a pricey
option, and thus, is unavailable to the majority of the Brazilian population) (Bazelon 2014).
One study, which was conducted by the New England Journal of Medicine, examined
requests for abortions performed in Latin America in response to the Zika virus. The study found
that in Latin American countries that issued warnings to pregnant women about the Zika virus,
requests to WoW for medical abortions had increased significantly. This study used Chile as a
control case, as the country did not issue warnings to pregnant women about the Zika virus, but
women still accessed the website, and found that between November 17, 2015, and March 2,
2016, WoW received 442 requests for medical abortions from Chilean women (Aiken et. al
2016, 396-398). This number of requests was the second highest in Latin America (behind Brazil
at 1,210 requests), and was almost twice as high as the third highest number of requests
(Argentina at 270 requests). Nicolas Perez, who researched this topic commented:
In one-hundred and seven days there were 450 petitions…but this is the most formal
number that we have, the true number should be 300% or 400% more…but also this
platform is limited to a higher social class, who has access to the internet…and from
there the question is how massive is the informal market, if there is a massive sale of this
drug on the internet that is very formal, what is happening on the informal market?
(Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).
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This study was important because there is little information about the true number of
abortions taking place in Chile, and the number of women who attempt to access the black
market every day. Although the study is unable to cover the full scope of the black market in
Chile, it does provide a picture of the most formalized element of the market, proves that a black
market for abortions in Chile does exist, and demonstrates that abortions continue to occur even
when they are made illegal. Having described the more formalized “parallel” market for abortion
in Chile, which is dominated by international NGOs such as Women Help Women and Women
on Web, I will now outline the final type of black market in Chile: the market for wealthy
Chilean women, which is accessed through private Chilean clinics and through the international
market for medical abortions.

Type 3: The Private/International Market
The third type of black market for abortions in Chile is the most difficult to access
because it requires money, resources, and contacts. This third type of black market can be broken
down into two parts: local, private clinics, and international clinics in countries where access to
abortion is less restricted. However, these two options are only accessible to women who are
able to pay high prices, either to doctors in private clinics, or to travel to other countries in Latin
America, or to the United States, where abortions are legal or are much more easily accessible
than in Chile. This third type of black market highlights the vast economic inequalities within
Chile, as well as the inequality in access to care that permeates the healthcare system.
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Private clinics
Although less common today than in the past, there are still some private clinics in Chile,
and doctors within these clinics, that will perform abortions. However, these procedures are very
expensive and are only accessible to a small portion of the population:
Yes, there are clinics here. Women with money come with an “appendicitis” or another
illness and they can abort easily in clinics that they know…because the doctors note that
it’s an “appendicitis” so women with money don’t have problems doing this. Our
problem is the poor women who can’t even access Misoprostol (Author Interview with
Erpel, January 25, 2017).
As some doctors are willing to lie on women’s medical records, wealthy women are able
to access clinics that they are familiar with, without the fear of prosecution or denouncement.
Additionally, these clinics that have doctors who are willing to provide abortions are more
common outside of big cities, such as Santiago. However, most women in these regions are
unable to pay for the procedure, although it is much safer and more sanitary than the traditional
abortive methods that poor women are often forced to use:
Yes I know that there are private clinics that provide abortions, but it’s very expensive.
Normally, in small cities, like Talca and Concepción there’s some doctor that is dedicated
to this, but it’s very costly…so the majority of people can’t access it (Author Interview
with Anonymous, February 14, 2017).

Additionally, although private clinics are still an option that wealthy women use to abort,
performing abortions is very risky for the doctor, and in recent years, these procedures have
become less common. Dr. Paulina Troncoso, a gynecologist who works for the Ministry of
Health in Santiago, and is part of la Program de la Mujer within the Ministry, describes some of
the risks to doctors who secretly perform abortions:
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I think there is a presence, but it’s very risky. Because of the press, and because it’s very
possible that someone has a camera, and it’s illegal. So it’s very risky. Before I knew of
some places where people went, but I think that each time there are less…if there are, it’s
very secret (Author Interview with Troncoso, January 26, 2017).

Furthermore, as there has been more discussion and acknowledgement of the presence of
these abortive clinics, within hospitals there are now stricter protocols to ensure that doctors are
not performing abortions. Dr. Domonique Truan, a high-risk obstetrician who works in a private
clinic in Santiago, describes some of these strict protocols within her hospital:

Look, I think there are still clinics that do it, but few because there has already been a lot
of discussion about this. For example, in the clinic where I work, if you want to perform a
uterine emptying, two doctors need to confirm the absence of a heartbeat…now you need
certification. So, from this discussion people are a bit more attentive, but still there are
doctors that do secret abortions (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Although the practice of performing abortions in private clinics is becoming less
prevalent within Santiago, which is largely influenced by the availability and ease of using
Misoprostol to perform abortions at home, this practice still represents an inequality in access to
care between the wealthy and the poor in Chile. Furthermore, this inequality is exacerbated by
the fact that denouncements of women who arrive at hospitals with abortion-related
complications almost never occur within private clinics, while in public clinics, where women of
lower socioeconomic statuses are forced to go, these denouncements are much more common:
In private clinics no, they don’t make denouncements. The registered denouncements in
Chile are all from public hospitals. Because the private clinics protect their clients.
(Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Private clinics that perform abortions are such a visible part of Chilean culture, that the
former Minister of Health, Helia Molina, publically stated “en todas las clínicas cuicas, muchas
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familias conservadoras han hecho abortar a sus hijas” (in all of the elite clinics, many
conservative families have made their daughters abort) (González and Castillo 2014). Ms.
Molina was essentially forced to step down due to this statement, but she still said “no se
arrepiente de nada” (I don’t regret anything), and did not apologize for making this comment
(González and Castillo 2014). If the Minister of Health acknowledges the existence of the private
market for abortions in Chile, it is clear that it is an important, and highly visible, element of the
black market for abortions in Chile, which further emphasizes this thesis’ research puzzle of why
the government is unable or unwilling to regulate this market. However, each day these private
clinics do become less and less prevalent, as hospital protocols become stricter, and doctors
become less willing to risk their jobs to perform these procedures. Consequently, another option
for the wealthy in Chile is for them to travel to countries in Latin America where abortions are
legal, or at least easier to access.

International clinics
The final element of the black market for abortion, that Chilean women access, is the
international market for abortions. Wealthy Chilean women are able to pay to travel to countries
or areas where abortion laws are less strict, such as the United States, Mexico City, and
Colombia. This option is particularly important and accessed by women who have advanced
pregnancies, and are unable to access the black market for Misoprostol in Chile (as this drug can
only be used up to twelve weeks of pregnancy) (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012).
Women that have the opportunity can travel to the United States because now it’s very
easy for Chileans to enter the United States without a visa. And I think it’s easy for
women who have the chance to leave the country when they have advanced pregnancies.
I know some people have gone to Mexico. But the majority stay here because it’s very
easy to get the medication (Author Interview with Anonymous, February 14, 2017).
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For wealthy women, it is easy for them to travel to countries, such as the United States,
where they can have abortions performed in Miami. However, women without money are unable
to access this option, and they are at the highest risk of having complications associated with
their pregnancies, and a lack of support throughout the process. This inequality in access is
especially apparent in relation to the three issues related to therapeutic abortion: risk to the
mother’s health, fetal malformations, and rape. Dr. Dominque Truan discusses how, from her
position as a doctor in a private clinic, she is able to direct her patients who have one of these
conditions to countries where they can abort, while the majority of the population is unable to
access this option:
This is how all legal things are. The people who are always harmed are the people who
are the most vulnerable; young people, those of a lower social class, because they don’t
have support. Because women that have money go to other countries. I have
recommended to some women that they go to distinct countries when they have fetuses
with malformations that are incompatible with life, and I have sent them to the United
States, to Colombia, to Mexico. But again, only women with money have access to this
solution, which is not the majority of the Chilean population. This theme touches on the
inequality within our country (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Although international travel is an option that many wealthy Chilean women use to
obtain abortions, especially in cases where they have advanced pregnancies or pregnancies that
would fall under the category of “therapeutic abortion,” this option is severely restricted to a high
socioeconomic class of women. This inequality in access is significant because it could allow
some women to get potentially life-saving treatments by traveling to other countries, which is an
option that even doctors, such as Dr. Truan, would recommend to their patients, while most
Chilean women would be forced to access potentially unsafe methods to achieve the same result.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I responded to the questions: how does the black market for abortion
function in Chile, who drives it, and how do women access it? In answering these questions, I
outlined the three different parts of the black market: the “traditional market,” which is made up
of both profit-driven figures and online websites that are operated on a more access-driven basis,
the “parallel market,” which consists of international and local NGOs, such as Women on Web
and Women Help Women, and the market for wealthy Chileans, made up of private clinics in
Chile and international clinics in countries with less strict abortion laws, such as the United
States, Mexico, and Colombia. In outlining these three different markets, I have laid out the
different types of actors who are involved in each market, and the ways that they interact. In
creating this descriptive chapter, which was necessary because previous literature does not
contain a detailed outline of the nuances of the black market for Misoprostol, I have set the scene
for the rest of this thesis, and the following chapters that discuss the regulation of this black
market. Having outlined how this black market for abortion functions in Chile, in the next
chapter I highlight how “full” regulation of each of these distinct elements of the black market
could look, and argue that this regulation falls far short of “full” regulation.
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CHAPTER 4: HOW DOES REGULATION OF THE BLACK MARKET FOR MEDICAL
ABORTION FUNCTION?

The presence of the black market for abortion in Chile is widely acknowledged; however,
there are few cases of prosecution of those who illegally perform abortions, or of those who sell
abortion-producing drugs. Consequently, in this chapter I seek to respond to the question: does
the regulation of the black market for abortion look different depending on the “type” of black
market and the actors involved (sellers and providers of the medications or procedures versus the
women who are their recipients)? In responding to this question, I hope to add to a literature
about when and why black markets are regulated, and develop a theory to respond to a Chilean
phenomenon that has of yet remained unexplained.
In this chapter, I first outline how we would expect the regulation of the three different
types of black markets, the traditional, parallel, and private black markets, to look, and I examine
the few cases where sellers or providers in this market have been charged. I then examine cases
where women who have abortions and their “accomplices” in these abortions are prosecuted, as a
point of contrast to the prosecution of the sellers of abortive medications. This chapter will be
used to provide a description of the three different forms that the regulation of the black market
for Misoprostol can take in Chile, as a way of demonstrating how this regulation falls short of
“full regulation,” and to create a context for Chapter 5, which provides hypotheses for why this
“full regulation” does not occur.

Charging Those Who Sell and Perform Abortions:
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the black market for abortion in Chile is made
up of three sub-types of markets: the traditional black market, the parallel market, and the private
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market. One of the important questions about the regulation of the black market for abortion in
Chile is how one would expect the regulation of each of these three types of markets to take
place, and how this regulation is actually being carried out. This comparison is important as a
means of understanding where the discrepancies lie between “strong” and “weak” regulation of
these different types of markets.

The traditional black market and the parallel black market
In chapter one, I created a working definition for how I understand regulation in terms of
the black market for Misoprostol in Chile; regulation is the management of social risks that take
place when individuals become involved in transactions with other individuals. I then outlined
what I mean by “strong, formal regulation,” and “weak, formal regulation,” and provided
examples of cases of strong and weak, formal regulation (see Figure 1). However, regulation
does not only vary by level of formality of regulation, and level of strength, but also by the type
of black market that is being regulated. Scholars have argued that regulation can look differently
depending on the actors who are involved, and where the transactions are taking place.
In relation to the first type of black market, that I have categorized as “the traditional
black market,” scholars make the claim that prosecution takes the form of police investigations,
and prosecutions within the court. In this case, the main investigators are generally police
officers. However, regulation of this market can also take the form of disruption of criminal
operations, rather than prosecution, as there are “higher costs of gathering ‘evidence’ rather than
‘intelligence,’” and the outcome of prosecution is often unpredictable (Gill 2002, 535-536). The
purpose of these market-disrupting actions is to raise the danger of involvement with this
traditional black market, and to constrain the freedom of the actors within it (Karp 1994, 188). In
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the case of the traditional black market for Misoprostol in Chile, the investigators are the police
and the PDI, and “strong regulation” of this market would look like a high number of cases of
prosecutions and investigations into venders of these medications.
A second area where scholars argue that regulation of black markets can take place is at
countries’ borders. With countries’ increasing emphasis on free trade and open borders, borders
become an important point of entry for goods, both licit and illicit. Academics argue that
customs officials have some of the greatest capacity to regulate black markets, because they have
the strongest legal authority for searching and inspecting people and goods (Flynn 2000, 58). In
the case of both the traditional black market and the parallel market for Misoprostol in Chile,
border officials play a very important role in the regulation of these markets, as they have the
ability to intercept these goods before they reach the black market. In the case of this type of
regulation, we would expect “strong regulation” to look like the prosecution at the border of a
high number of cases of smuggling Misoprostol, particularly between Peru and Chile, and the
postal service’s detection of a high number of cases of Misoprostol entering the country.
The model of “strong regulation” of the traditional and parallel black markets for medical
abortion in Chile would look like regulation by the aduanas (border patrol), by the PDI, and
more specifically, by the Cybercrime Brigade within the PDI, and by denouncements from the
postal service. In the case of the traditional black market for Misoprostol, there are three places
where the prosecution of the actors in this market could occur: at the border (by aduanas), online
(through the Cybercrime Brigade), or through the postal service (as sellers send Misoprostol
through Chile Express (Western Union) to women who live in regions that are inaccessible to the
sellers (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
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As the majority of the abortion medications that enter Chile come from sellers bringing it
across the border from places like Peru and Bolivia, regulation of this market could look like
border officials searching travelers for these medications, and charging the sellers with the
possession of a banned drug. The possession of Misoprostol without a prescription is not
considered a delito (crime) but is categorized as a falta (misdemeanor). If someone commits a
falta, they generally only have to pay a fine, or may be subject to a short period of time in prison;
whereas if they commit a delito, they will likely be imprisoned for longer periods of time. The
sale of Misoprostol is categorized a “falta” in Chile’s Código Sanitario (Sanitary Code) because
the sale of the medication isn’t necessarily associated with abortions, as the drug can also be
used to prevent ulcers. Consequently, if a person were caught with Misoprostol, they would be
charged with being in possession of an illegal medication, rather than with the crime of
committing an abortion (Aborto Express 2016).
The regulation of the traditional black market for Misoprostol by the Cybercrime Brigade
would look like the Cybercrime Brigade tracking down people with websites such as
“vendomistrol.com,” or acting like a woman who is seeking the drug, and intercepting the sale in
a metro station. In an interview with the Chilean magazine Paula, Bárbara León, sub-inspector
of the Cybercrime Brigade commented that: “Generally, the seller and the buyer get in contact
through email. We find the address where the emails are coming from and we find the person
that sent them” (Aborto Express 2016).
As the emails and websites of the sellers of Misoprostol are readily available, one would
assume that it would be relatively easy for the Cybercrime Brigade to crack down on this part of
the traditional black market; however, in the interview Bárbara León added that “…we only act
when there is a complaint” (Aborto Express 2016). Consequently, although the Cybercrime
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Brigade may have the resources to regulate the sale of Misoprostol online, it only acts when they
are informed about a case of the sale of Misoprostol, instead of investigating the online market
themselves. Furthermore, Nicolas Perry argues that:
…the problem is that for there to exist the procedure there would need to be a
denouncement. And the denouncements that are taken seriously and generate
investigations are from government departments like the Ministry of Health…instead of
from a citizen with little evidence (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).

As a result, there are very few cases of denouncements of the sale of Misoprostol, despite
the fact that there are a large number of sellers. Between 2004 and 2006, the Cybercrime Brigade
only investigated five cases of the sale of Misoprostol, and it is unknown if any of these cases
were convicted (Aborto Express 2016). In fact, the documentary La Línea de Aborto shows an
interview with one seller of Misoprostol in Concepción, Chile:
I’m not a drug trafficker. I don’t sell coke or marijuana, only Misoprostol. Seven years
ago, I was summoned to court. I was told that I was committing an infraction of the
Sanitary Code, and that they couldn’t accuse me because I didn’t practice abortions, I was
just selling drugs outside of established places. I went to a Bureau with my lawyer, and in
ten minutes he closed the case, and nothing happened to me (Rist and Chartier & Lopez
Escrivá, 2016).

From these interviews, it appears that the Cybercrime Brigade does not view the online
sale of Misoprostol as a top priority, and that it only uses its resources to investigate the sale of
Misoprostol in select cases. One of the most recent cases of the prosecution of a seller of
Misoprostol was on November 17, 2015 in Rancagua, Chile. In this case, a man was charged for
selling Misoprostol and violating article 314 of Chile’s Penal Code. However, this man was only
charged because the women to whom he sold Misoprostol arrived at the hospital with abortionrelated complications, and the remains of Misoprostol were found in her vagina. In this case, the

68

Brigada de Delitos Sexuales y Menores (The Brigade of Minor and Sexual Crimes) arrived and
prosecuted both the woman and the seller (at a latter point in time) (Detienen a una
mujer…2015). Article 314 of Chile’s Penal Code states:

Anyone who, in any capacity, sells substances dangerous to health, other than those
indicated in the previous article, in contravention of the legal or regulatory provisions
established in consideration of the dangerousness of said substances, shall be punished
with lesser imprisonment in its minimum to medium, and a fine of six to twenty monthly
tax units (Código Penal Artículo 314 Chile).

If a person is charged with violating article 314 of the Penal Code, they can be subject to
a fine or lesser punishment, which means from sixty-one days to five years of imprisonment.
However, it is clear that there are few cases where police actually enact this article and prosecute
sellers of Misoprostol in the traditional black market.
In regards to the second area where one could image regulation of the traditional black
market for Misoprostol, at Chile’s border, there are also few recorded cases of the detection and
prosecution of sellers bringing the drug across the border. One of the most recent cases occurred
on July 18, 2015, and entailed two people being detained at the Chilean-Argentine border
crossing, Pino Hachado. These sellers carried 21,000 abortion pills with them, which were
valued at more than one million dollars. The main reason why these sellers were detained was
that authorities thought the pills were methamphetamines (Millonario contraband a
Chile…2015). From this case, it appears that the border patrol is more focused on prosecuting
cases of the trafficking of drugs, rather than the smuggling of illegal medications. Furthermore,
the Argentine border is better equipped than the Peruvian or the Bolivian border, where it would
be much easier for someone to bring Misoprostol across the border, which is where the majority
of Misoprostol that enters Chile originates (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).
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In regards to the last area where one could image that regulation of the traditional black
market could take place, through denouncements to the PDI by the postal service, there do not
appear to be many prosecutions of sellers through this venue. This last area of regulation is also
how one would expect the regulation of the parallel market for Misoprostol to take place. This
parallel market is dominated by international organizations, such as Women Help Women and
Women on Web, who send the medications through the mail to Chilean women. However,
neither Women Help Women nor Women on Web have ever had problems with the Chilean PDI
or postal service denouncing their organizations or shipments (Author Interview with
Anonymous, February 14, 2017). The only country that has been able to stop, or has attempted to
disrupt Women on Web’s efforts is Brazil:

In 2015, the Pan-American health organization issued an alert for Zika, so the NGO had
many requests for the drug. So the government became interested in this NGO, as the
pills were illegal in brazil…. One-hundred pills a day were being sent to Brazil. So the
government tried to stop the NGOs’ entrance to Brazil (Author Interview with Perry,
January 18, 2017).

Women on Web was providing free abortions to women in countries that were affected
with Zika; however, as abortion is only allowed for therapeutic purposes in Brazil, customs
officials were stopping all packages from Women on Web. Consequently, Women on Web has
stopped sending the medications to Brazil, and issued the statement: “Unfortunately the Brazilian
government stops all packages that contain medical abortions. Women on Web “calls upon the
Brazilian government and Anvisa to suspend the interception of packages with medical abortions
at least for the duration of the Zika epidemic” (https://www.womenonweb.org/ 2017). However,
the Chilean government has not made efforts to stop these NGOs from sending packages to
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Chile, and both the domestic and international mailing of Misoprostol appears to occur with little
interception or investigation.

The private black market
A final area where scholars argue that regulation of abortion can take place is by
prosecuting doctors or midwifes who illegally perform abortions. In the past, in the context of
abortion-related complications, doctors have encouraged women to name the healthcare
professional who provided them with the abortion, so that they could give the police this
information, and the healthcare professional could be prosecuted. For example, when abortion
was made illegal in Chicago from 1867 to 1940, in most cases involving abortion the state
prosecuted the healthcare professionals who provided women with their abortions, often from the
evidence from women’s dying declarations related to their illegal abortions. In order to obtain
evidence, the state needed the cooperation of doctors, as prosecutors would have difficulty
enforcing abortion laws without this collaboration. Furthermore, this practice was characterized
by inequality, as wealthy women avoided investigations, while poor women were often forced to
use more dangerous methods to abort, that were detected when they sought care for their
complications (Reagan 1991, 1240-1246). Similarly, the private black market for abortion in
Chile is characterized by inequality, and regulation of the medical professionals that provide
abortions within private clinics requires the cooperation of doctors and hospital administration.
The private black market is distinct from the traditional and parallel black markets for
abortion in the sense that these two markets provide drugs to women who abort at home, while in
the private black market, women are assisted in their abortions in hospitals. The private black
market for Misoprostol would likely be the easiest of the three types of markets to regulate,
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because this activity is more visible than the other two forms of black markets. The regulation of
this private black market would most likely look like hospital administration creating guidelines
to ensure that doctors are not lying and performing “appendicitis surgeries.” If a doctor violated
these guidelines, regulation would then take place through hospital administration reporting the
transgression to the police officer stationed at the hospital, or through the PDI investigating
private clinics or doctors who they believe may be engaging in this activity. Doctors, such as
Dominque Truan, have reported that increased strictness in hospital guidelines has ensured that
doctors perform fewer abortions; however, Truan also noted that “private clinics protect their
clients and doctors,” and consequently, that the majority of denouncements occur in public,
rather than private hospitals (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Charging Women Who Had Abortions and Their “Accomplices”
Traditionally, many of the cases surrounding the black market for abortion in Chile that
are prosecuted are of the women who have taken abortive drugs, rather than the sellers who
provide them with these medications. Between 1977 and 1995, a study conducted by Lydia
Casas Beccera found that within Santiago’s Women’s Prison, there were 132 files of men and
women who had been charged with abortion-related crimes. These included eighty women who
had received abortions, forty abortion providers (thirty-nine who were women, none of whom
were doctors, and all who provided these women with high-risk procedures), and twelve
accomplices who either helped the women locate the provider, or went with the women to the
hospital for abortion-related complications (Women Behind Bars 1998, 54-55). However, this
profile of prosecutions has begun to change with the introduction of Misoprostol, as women are
less likely to seek these high-risk abortion providers, and instead, abort at home. A recent study
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that investigated cases through the Defensoría Penal Pública (Public Penal Defense) found that
between 2010 and 2014, there were 271 crimes associated with abortion. This study found that
the majority of people prosecuted for abortion-related crimes were women; 182 women were
prosecuted, while only 89 men were charged for a similar crime (Salud Sexual, Salud
Reproductiva 2016, 121).
Furthermore, the majority of denouncements of women occur through hospitals. A study
conducted by the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy and the Open Forum on Reproductive
Health and Rights found that from 1983-1984 and 1990-1991, 92% of institutional reports of
abortion came from hospitals (See Figure 4). These high rates of reporting and prosecutions are a
legacy of the Pinochet-era policies that criminalized abortion, and encouraged the prosecution of
women engaging in this practice. In this study, all of the hospitals that reported women were
public, and there was not one instance of a private hospital reporting women who had performed
abortions. Furthermore, each medical institution has its own reporting process for abortionrelated cases. Most hospitals report cases of abortion through calling the police officer assigned
to their hospital, although some hospitals have sent lists of patients who have “confessed” to the
crime of abortion, and oftentimes these confessions are obtained through coercion (Women
Behind Bars 1998, 54-55). In the documentary La Línea del Aborto, there is an interview with
Hernán Medel, the sub-commissioner of the PDI. In relation to the reporting process, Medel
comments that:

Even without the fetus, a doctor could have enough evidence to say that this woman was
pregnant, and can say she had an abortion. We then coordinate with the hospital and the
doctors, and interview them. And if the women don’t confess, we interview other people
to see if they committed the crime or not (Rist and Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016).
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Figure 4: Reports Against Women Who Had Abortions,
Classified by Origin of Report (Total 1983-84 and 1990-91)
Hospital
Police
Intelligence Police
Other
Partner
Family Member
Stranger
Herself
Total

127
7
3
1
8
9
1
3
159

Source: 1998. Women Behind Bars. The Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy and the Open Forum on Reproductive Health and Rights. New
York, NY, 49.

Sometimes it is not obvious if women arrive with abortion-related complications, or if
they have had a miscarriage, following their use of Misoprostol. If women take Misoprostol
orally, doctors are unable to detect it within their system, and they present with the same
symptoms as if they had simply had a miscarriage. However, many women receive inaccurate
information from sellers, and end up using Misoprostol vaginally. In this way, when women
arrive at hospitals with these complications, they are often prosecuted due to the remains of the
medications that doctors find in their vaginas (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012).
However, doctors are not required to report their patients who arrive with abortionrelated complications. Doctors may be confused about their reporting obligations in relation to
abortions, because on one hand, they are required to report any crimes that they are presented
with in the hospital (and within the Sanitary Code, abortion is illegal); however, on the other
hand, doctors have the obligation to protect patient confidentiality. Consequently, many doctors
that do not know about their rights, or are scared about being prosecuted themselves, may report
women unintentionally (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017). Article 19 of the
Chilean Constitution guarantees “respect for the protection of the private and public life of an
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individual and his or her reputation and that of his or her family,” and article 10 of the Chilean
Medical Professional Association establishes that maintaining patient confidentiality is a doctor’s
duty (Women Behind Bars 1998, 49). Furthermore, in 2009, the Ministry of Health issued a
directive to directors of health services stating that: “Medical attention should be unconditional,
and any confession obtained in the described context is completely illegal” (Ord A15 Número
1404, 2014).
This directive asserted that it is illegal for doctors to obtain confessions from women
about if they have committed an abortion, as the use of coercion to obtain these confessions can
be defined as torture. Furthermore, on May 2, 2014, the Ministry of Health issued a second
ordinance, A14 number 1403, that re-enforced the importance of doctor-patient confidentiality in
cases of abortions (Ord A15 Número 1675, 2009). As a result, public officials from the Ministry
of Health have visited hospitals, particularly those that have denounced women for having
abortions, and told doctors and administrators about their duties related to patient confidentiality
(Author Interview with Soto, January 25, 2017).
Many doctors don’t know about laws related to patient confidentiality, and make
denouncements. But we, as the Ministry of Health, have gone to these places that have
shown up in the press, and meet with the team, and tell them about confidentiality and
human rights… We’ve worked a lot with themes of confidentiality, so that women aren’t
denounced. Many doctors know this, and don’t make the denouncement. But some new
doctors do, because they fear something could happen to them, and they think that they
have to denounce it…They immediately denounce it to the police, and in every hospital,
there is a policeman…And when this happens, they are in the press, so we can quickly
intervene (Author Interview with Soto, January 25, 2017).

From these interviews, it appears that the Ministry of Health is opposed to
denouncements against women who have had abortions, and arrive at hospitals seeking help.
Furthermore, the Ministry of Health is also actively working to stop hospitals from making these
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types of denouncements. However, the Chilean government also appears to be more willing to
prosecute women who have had abortions, than sellers of abortive medications or healthcare
providers who perform abortions, although this practice of high levels of denouncements of these
women may decline with the Ministry of Health’s current efforts.

Conclusion:
In this chapter, I responded to the questions: what are the forms that the regulation of the
black market for Misoprostol could take, who would be the actors in the regulation of this
market, and how does the regulation of the black market fail to meet a model of “strong
regulation?” In answering these questions, I examined how “strong regulation” would look in
each of the three different types of black markets, as a means of comparing this model of
regulation to the true level of regulation in each case, to demonstrate the ways in which it falls
short. I also analyzed cases where women who have had abortions, and their “accomplices” have
been charged, to demonstrate the areas of the black market where government officials prioritize
regulation. The purpose of this chapter was to outline how regulation looks different for each
type of black market, and how within each market, government officials do not engage in strong,
formal regulation. This chapter creates a context for Chapter 5, which examines the motivations
behind the reasons why government officials do not engage in full regulation of the black
market. Chapter 5 offers three hypotheses to explain why government officials might decide to
pursue a policy of weak regulation of the black market for Misoprostol, in the efforts to answer
the question: why has the government been unable or unwilling to regulate the black market for
abortion in Chile?

76

CHAPTER 5: WHY HAS THE GOVERNMENT BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
REGULATE THE BLACK MARKET FOR ABORTION IN CHILE?

Chapter 4 demonstrated how the regulation of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile
falls short of “full regulation.” This chapter will build off Chapter 5, and seeks to answer the
question: why has the Chilean government been unable or unwilling to regulate the black market
for Misoprostol in Chile? In answering this question, this chapter outlines three hypotheses for
why there are low levels of regulation of the black market. The first hypothesis that this chapter
investigates is that there are differing levels of regulation based on the different types of actors
involved in the market. The second hypothesis is that levels of regulation do not depend on the
type of actor; instead, weak regulation is due to bureaucrats’ desires to uphold the norms of their
positions and to protect their interests through the two mechanisms of a drop in maternal
mortality rates/complications related to abortions, and a reduction in hospital costs. The third
hypothesis (the alternative hypothesis) presented in this chapter is that low rates of regulation are
caused by a lack of information about the black market, and a lack of government capacity. The
purpose of this chapter is to seek to explain the phenomenon of weak regulation of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile, and to extend theories about regulation and bureaucrats’
motivations.

Hypothesis 1: Differing Levels of Regulation Based on Type of Actor
The first hypothesis that I investigate is that there are differing levels of enforcement
based on the type of actor. In this scenario, one could imagine that the PDI would be more
willing to prosecute the traditional black market, than the parallel or private market for abortion.
This would be the case because the traditional black market is run in a manner more associated
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with typical “criminals,” who are involved in drug trafficking, than the parallel market, made up
of international NGOs, which are well-known and respected, or the private market for abortions,
which are conducted in private clinics by doctors who are also well-respected in Chilean society.
Some scholars have argued that bureaucrats and public officials are most motivated by
self-interest. Lane and Kivisto applied the principal-agent model to politics, arguing that
politicians are principals and bureaucrats are agents (Lane and Kivisto 2008, 176). Within this
argument, these actors share different interests, but each of these interests are due to the fact that
both actors are “rational utility maximizers.” In this scenario, politicians have an interest in
engaging in policies that will get them re-elected, and benefit their constituents, shirking any
activities that could be against these interests, and bureaucrats seek to maximize budgets (Lane
and Kivisto 2008, 176). Within this theory, public officials are not motivated by norms, values,
or ideas; rather, they only focus on themselves. This theory could apply to hypothesis 1, because
in this scenario, one would image that politicians or government officials would be less willing
to encourage the prosecution of international NGOs or doctors because of the potential political
costs, while allowing the prosecution of the traditional market, where sellers are viewed as
“criminals,” and their prosecution would be applauded by conservative constituents.
Consequently, these officials would not be as focused on potential norms of justice or equal
prosecution and, instead, would be motivated by their self-interested desire of maintaining
positive public opinion, and not upsetting influential actors in society.
During my interviews with multiple Chilean public officials, they echoed the sentiment
that the government allows private clinics to exist because the majority of government officials
have some relationship to someone who has used these services to abort, or because they do not
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view the people who attempt to access this method of aborting (or who provide abortions) as
typical “criminals.” Ministry of Health official, Paulina Troncoso, stated:
This is a country of double standards. I’m sure their children have taken pills for
abortion, but publically they display different opinions…since there is a very
conservative discourse in Chile (Author Interview with Troncoso, January 26, 2017).

Yanira Zuniga, a lawyer and professor at la Universidad Austral de Chile, expressed
similar opinions to Troncoso and commented:

There is a duplicity of public-private discourse about abortion. Often abortions in private
clinics are committed by women who belong to the same political families that turn
around and denounce abortions. This is similar to what happened with divorce.
Parliamentarians would be publically against, but would annul their marriages (Author
Interview with Zuniga, January 17, 2017).

There is a widely-shared view that neither politicians nor bureaucrats would support the
prosecution of private clinics, because either people in their families or their friends have had to
utilize these resources, and therefore that they do not view prosecution of these areas as
politically within their interests. What is surprising is that there are also low rates of prosecution
of the traditional black market for Misoprostol, where one would expect to see the highest levels
of prosecution, due to the market’s more obviously “illicit” status. Although there are a few
cases of people getting stopped at the border for trying to smuggle Misoprostol into the country,
these cases are infrequent in relation to the size of the traditional black market, and the number
of women who are aborting using Misoprostol. Furthermore, in cases of the online sale of
Misoprostol, which also makes up the traditional black market, as highlighted above, the PDI
only investigates cases of sellers of Misoprostol when there has been a denouncement. Although
this traditional black market is the most visible of the three, as there are at least twenty websites
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with the sellers’ email addresses and phone numbers, the PDI does not appear to be more
invested in prosecuting this market than the other two forms of the black market (Author
Interview with José, January 12, 2017)
From case studies, it appears that the police and PDI are most focused on charging
women who have undergone abortions, rather than those who have sold them abortion-causing
drugs. In response to the question “what is the government doing to prosecute the black market
for abortion in Chile?” María Jose, employee of Con las Amigas y en la Casa, responded:
The government isn’t doing anything, or very little. There were a few cases from the
press…but those who are most condemned are the women. It’s not the men who are
selling the drugs…which is why it’s important to work for the depenalization of
therapeutic abortion, to take away the culpability (Author Interview with José, January
12, 2017).

Consequently, the main reason why there are low levels of regulation of the black market
for abortion in Chile does not appear to be because government officials favor regulation of the
more “criminalized” part of the black market over regulation of the parallel and private markets,
which consist of actors who have a higher status in society and who officials might not want to
anger. Although this reasoning could be a partial factor in why there are even fewer prosecutions
of private clinics and international NGOs than actors in the traditional black market for
Misoprostol, it is unable to provide an explanation for why regulation of this black market as a
whole is so shockingly low. As a result, I will move on to discussing the second hypothesis: that
levels of regulation do not depend on type of actor, and instead, that weak regulation is due to
bureaucrats’ desires to uphold professional norms, and protect their interests.
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Hypothesis 2: Levels of Regulation do not Depend on Type of Actor; Rather, Regulation is
Dependent on Bureaucrats Upholding Norms and Protecting their Interests
The second hypothesis for why there are low levels of regulation of the black market for
abortion in Chile is that bureaucrats feel that it is more important to uphold the norms of their
position and maintain their interests, than pushing for the prosecution of the black market. In this
case, there are two reasons why bureaucrats would act in this way. There is a broad scholarly
debate about bureaucratic norms, and the motivations that bureaucrats face. Abers writes that this
debate initially assumed that bureaucrats were essentially rule-followers, and were only forced to
make decisions about which rules they should apply (Abers 2016, 5). However, other scholars
argue that bureaucrats are actually governed by the principal-agent theory, and that they are
“self-interested utility maximizers” that are only motivated by activities that further their selfinterest (Lane and Kivisto 2008, 152).
Finally, a third theory about bureaucrats’ motivations is that “actors can be moved by
values, ideologies or political projects, not just rules and incentives” (Abers 2016, 5). For
example, Tumers found that in the case of Dutch public healthcare professionals and
policymakers’ willingness to implement a new insurance model, this willingness was more
dependent on their view of the value that this policy added for society, rather than their own
influence on creating the policy, or their view of the positive impacts that this policy could have
for them (Tumers 2011, 576) Consequently, these lower level bureaucrats were more influenced
by the professional norms of their position as healthcare professionals than their self-interest or
rule-following. Abers also found that in the case of the Green Grants Program (an environmental
cause in Brazil), that public officials were motivated by bureaucratic activism to pursue this
environmental cause, even in the face of opposition from their superiors. These bureaucratic
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actors were motivated by the ideas and concepts that they believed in, and therefore, were
surprisingly willing to go against their interests to stand up for this policy (Abers 2016, 1).
Consequently, this hypothesis furthers Tumers’ and Abers’ arguments by proposing that
Chilean bureaucrats, particularly within the Ministry of Health, are also motivated by their norms
as healthcare professionals to pursue a policy of not encouraging the regulation of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile, due to the societal benefits of its presence. Although this policy
did maximize their immediate self-interest, it did provide important societal benefits. The first
societal benefit of the presence of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile is that the
introduction of Misoprostol is associated with a reduction in the maternal mortality rate in Chile
(and around the world), and furthermore, is associated with a decrease in abortion relatedcomplications. As a result, prosecuting the black market for Misoprostol in Chile, which has
clearly led to many beneficial outcomes, would go against officials’ norms of acting as “public
servants” who seek to improve circumstances for the population, rather than make them worse.
Furthermore, the government has been attempting for many years, and has invested a lot of
money into trying to decrease the maternal mortality rate in Chile; it would not make sense for
them to attempt to prosecute those who have helped them to achieve their goals.
The second reason why officials would not attempt to prosecute this market is that it has
led to a reduction in septic units in hospitals, for abortion-related complications, which saves
both hospitals and the government money. As a result, it would go against both these public
officials’ norms and interests to prosecute a practice that is helping to save them lives and
money.
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Mechanism 1: Decreased complications and a reduction in the maternal mortality rate
The first reason why bureaucrats may decide to pursue a policy of low levels of
regulation of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile, based on their desire to follow
bureaucratic norms, is that Misoprostol has led to a reduction in abortion-related complications
and to a decrease in Chile’s (previously high) mortality rate. In comparison to many other Latin
American countries, Chile currently has a fairly low maternal mortality rate. Between 1990 and
2003, the maternal mortality rate decreased from 40 deaths per 100,000 live births to 12 deaths
per 100,000 live births. This reduction was largely caused by the government’s promotion of
contraceptives, as in the 1960s, more than one-third of maternal deaths were caused by abortions
(Salud Sexual, Salud Reproductiva 2016, 121). With the introduction of contraceptives, there has
been a decrease in maternal mortality rates, birth rates, and deaths caused by abortions (see
Figure 5).

Figure 5: Maternal Mortality Rates and Maternal Mortality Rates for Abortion (19902000)

Source: Troncoso and Soto: Maternal Mortality and Morbidity from Abortion in Chile: Critical Analysis of National
Statistics.
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Although the introduction of contraceptives has been very important in creating the drop
in Chile’s mortality rate, Misoprostol has also been essential in contributing to this decline, and
especially to the drop in rates of complications related to abortions. Studies and reports,
including one written by bureaucrats from the Ministry of Health, Paulina Troncoso and Eduardo
Soto, have found that Misoprostol plays a role in reducing the number of insecure abortions, and
therefore, in reducing the number of hospitalizations and deaths that they cause (Troncoso and
Soto, 8). Studies have shown that the substantial decline in abortion rates that was observed
between 1995 and 2003 has slowed, and that the proportion of unsafe abortions performed
worldwide has increased since 1995. For example, in 2008, half of all abortions worldwide were
unsafe. Furthermore, strict abortion laws (like those seen in Chile) are not associated with lower
abortion rates, and in fact more liberal abortion laws are associated with declines in rates of
unsafe abortions (Sedgh et al. 2012, 630-631). When women are unable to access safe and legal
abortions, they resort to the use of other methods, such as herbs, which often lead to infections
and hospitalizations (Miller et al. 2005, 1291). Moreover, medical abortion has been found to be
safe and effective in developing countries (if used properly), as its efficacy is 88-96% for firsttrimester abortions (Harper et al. 2007, 67).
There are few studies on the effectiveness of Misoprostol in less controlled settings (such
as when women abort at home), but studies in the Dominican Republic and Brazil have found
that the use of Misoprostol is associated with fewer infections and abortion-related
complications. In one Brazilian city where Misoprostol was restricted, there were increased rates
of abortion-related morbidity, and a tripling of the maternal mortality rate (Miller et al. 2005,
1219). Moreover, a study conducted in the Dominican Republic found that with the introduction
of Misoprostol, abortion-related complications decreased from 11.7% in 1986 to 1.7% in 2001
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(although they commented that their study had limitations) (Miller et al. 2005, 1219). One study,
using a modeling approach with high and low mortality rates in Africa, Asia, and Latin America,
found that under conditions of high mortality rates, there is a 15% reduction in mortality rates if
20% of the procedures are Misoprostol-induced, and a 45% reduction if 60% are Misoprostolinduced. Even in Latin American countries with low mortality rates, such as Chile, the study
found that with 40% of abortions being Misoprostol-induced, there would be a 26% reduction in
maternal death (Harper et al. 2007, 67-8).
Although few studies have been conducted in Chile on the effect of the introduction of
Misoprostol on the maternal mortality rate, it is clear that bureaucrats and public officials from
the Ministry of Health recognize that its introduction, and the creation of the black market in
Chile, have contributed to a drop in these rates, and therefore, that its presence is important. In
fact, Paulina Troncoso commented that:
The existence of Misoprostol helps in a way with public health. It’s like I see it, but I
don’t want to see it. So, there aren’t denouncements, and I don’t think the government is
going to do anything. Because the government is full of contradictions, the government
has very progressive and conservative sectors, but the government isn’t so conservative
that they are going to prosecute it knowing that there are women who use it and that its
their only access, since the wealthy can go to other countries (Author Interview with
Troncoso, January 26, 2017).

From this comment, and the numerous studies showing the benefits of Misoprostol on
reducing the maternal mortality rate in Chile, it seems that one of the main reasons for the lack of
government regulation of Misoprostol is that government officials realize that it would not be in
their interests to prosecute an illegal activity that has been effective in decreasing Chile’s
maternal mortality rate. Although illegal, this activity is helping to solve a problem that used to
be a high priority for the Ministry of Health to solve. Ministry of Health officials, Eduardo Soto
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and Paulina Troncoso, made it clear that one of their priorities was to ensure that hospitals do not
denounce women who enter with abortion complications. Although having an abortion breaks
the law, these officials view part of their professional duty as working to ensure the health and
well-being of their population; they consequently weigh ensuring women get the treatment that
they need over prosecuting their engagement in an illegal activity. Moreover, by choosing to
enforce the ban on Misoprostol in Chile, it is possible that Chile could experience the same
phenomenon that happened in the Brazilian city when Misoprostol was restricted, and Chile’s
maternal mortality rate could again rise steeply. Furthermore, many of the bureaucrats in the
Ministry of Health are doctors or midwives, and are dedicated to saving lives. As a result, the
norms of their position would indicate that they would not choose to take actions that would have
negative consequences on Chilean women’s health, and on the country as a whole. Although
government agencies are not heterogeneous, and different officials within the Chilean
government may be motivated by different norms, this theory is important because it suggests
that some Chilean bureaucrats are influenced by these bureaucratic norms, and therefore, may act
in ways that appear to be contrary to official government policy.

Mechanism 2: Decreased costs for clinics
The second reason why government officials would be opposed to regulating the black
market for Misoprostol is that the introduction of the medication has helped to save them and the
hospitals money. In Chile, hospitals used to have expensive septic units to treat complications
and infections caused by abortions. However, with the introduction of Misoprostol, these
expensive septic units have essentially disappeared. Dr. Ramiro Molina, a gynecologist and
professor at la Universidad de Chile, related how this change took place:
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I was the director of obstetrician and gynecology services in the hospital at the University
of Chile…In 1984, one of the units in the new building was a “unidad septica” (septic
unit) to attend to infected abortions, abortion complications. There were 17 or 18 beds in
the septic unit…All septic abortion units in public and private hospitals that had always
existed, and were very important, disappeared with the introduction of Misoprostol.
Abortion didn’t disappear, septic abortions did in all of Latin America. Abortions
continued in the same amount and as important as before...Intensive care units are very
expensive, with septic shock you need technology, and now they don’t exist (Author
Interview with Molina, January 13, 2017).
From Molina’s response, it appears that Misoprostol has been important in saving
hospitals and the government money, as maintaining intensive care units is expensive, and the
introduction of Misoprostol essentially eliminated the need for an entire unit in all Chilean
hospitals. This sentiment, that the introduction of Misoprostol has essentially wiped out all of the
septic units that used to exist in Chile, was echoed by many of the doctors that I interviewed,
both pro-life and pro-choice. This drop in septic abortions is so stark because in the past, there
used to be “aborteros,” or professionals who would perform clandestine abortions, but in
generally unsanitary conditions and using unsafe methods (Author Interview with Molina,
January 13, 2017). Consequently, Misoprostol has come to replace aborteros. Furthermore, with
the introduction of Misoprostol:
There was a notable change in the maternal mortality rate…In the past, Chile had one of
the highest rates in Latin America, due to abortion complications, septic abortions…Then
with the introduction of Misoprostol, the maternal mortality rate from abortion
complications dropped greatly, and the use of Misoprostol has saved many lives (Author
Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

As a result, if the government decided to prosecute the black market for medical abortion
in Chile, it is likely that the rate of septic abortions would again rise, which could re-open these
costly septic units throughout Chile. Therefore, it would be against the government’s interests to
pursue sellers of Misoprostol. Ramiro Molina further described why this situation occurs:
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If the Ministry of Health gets into a fight against Misoprostol they are “cutting the neck.”
It’s a political theme. That’s why there are twenty webpages and they all function well.
They have always known about them. There is a double standard, we’re cynics,
hypocrites, liars, we know what’s the reality. If we apply the law and arrest those who
use and sell…they would fill the jails. And it’s a legal problem. Leave it, don’t touch it. If
it’s not published, nobody wants to show what’s happening, that we have a double
standard. Obviously they are not going to do anything in relation to Misoprostol because
it saves a tremendous amount of money (Author Interview with Molina, January 13,
2017).
For government officials, attempting to prosecute the black market would be “cutting the
neck,” because Misoprostol has been very influential in reducing Chile’s significant maternal
mortality rate, decreasing cases of abortion-related complications, and saving the government
money by shutting down septic care units. To prosecute the sellers of this black market, thereby
reducing the supply and presence of these medications, would be contrary to both government
bureaucrats’ professional norms, and their interests.

Hypothesis 3 (alternative hypothesis): Lack of Regulation Based on a Lack of Information
About the Market, and a Lack of Resources to Address it
The final (and alternative) hypothesis for why there is a lack of regulation of the black
market for abortion in Chile is that the government and the PDI lack the capacity to address this
problem. Scholars argue that the relationship between informal and black markets is always in
inevitable conflict, as the purpose of a state is to assume a monopoly of authority within a
territory, while the purpose of informal or black markets is to avoid or undermine the state’s
authority. Although the relationship between state strength and capacity is complex, in general,
“the weaker the state, the greater the likelihood of an economy being able to escape its grasp”
(Centeno and Portes 2006, 29).
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In the scenario of the regulation of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile, a lack of
state capacity would look like the PDI not having the information or the resources to investigate
the presence of the three types of black markets. With the traditional black market, there could be
difficulty in regulating the sellers because the government either does not have the resources or
the information to do so. However, although there is some asymmetry in information within this
black market, everyone knows how to access it, and who to call or email to get this information,
which assumes that a specialized agency like the Cybercrime Brigade would be able to do so as
well if they chose to act. In regards to this claim, Dr. Dominque Truan commented:
There are few prosecutions of Misoprostol. It’s very available and it’s very easy to buy
because there are a lot of phone numbers. And it’s not very prosecuted for the people
who sell it…Maybe the government is more interested in stopping drugs. But I have the
opinion that because it’s so easy to get, that there isn’t much prosecution (Author
Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Although it may be difficult to investigate this black market, there is a significant amount
of visibility of the transactions that take place within it. From Bárbara León’s comments that the
Cybercrime Brigade only acts when they receive a denouncement, it appears that the government
may have the capacity to intervene and regulate this market, but that it chooses to allow it to
exist in some capacity (Aborto Express 2016).
In regards to the parallel black market for Misoprostol in Chile, it is possible that the
Chilean government could have difficulties in stopping the entrance of these packages of
Misoprostol, sent from organizations such as Women on Web and Women Help Women, if the
postal service were not looking for them. Nicolas Perry stated:
You could send it from Holland and it wouldn’t be detected unless border patrol was
looking for it. People could buy boxes in a foreign country and bring it in without any
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problem…So it’s hard to regulate it if you don’t know where it’s coming from, who is
buying it (Author Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).

However, in the case of Women on Web in Brazil, the Brazilian government called for
customs officials to investigate all packages from Women on Web, and these agents were able to
stop their entrance into Brazil, leading Women on Web to cease sending them altogether
(https://www.womenonweb.org/ 2017). As in general, Chile’s government is considered to have
a greater capacity than Brazil’s, one would expect that if the Chilean government decided to act,
it would be able to suspend the entrance of packages from these organizations as well.
Consequently, one would conclude that a lack of capacity is not the main reason for why there
are low levels of regulation of the black market.
In regards to the third type of black market, as stated above, it would be difficult to
regulate the private market for abortions in Chile. However, there also appears to be a norm that
it would be unexpected for a doctor in these hospitals to be prosecuted for providing an abortion,
which is described by social worker, Luis Rodriguez: “They say that it’s a crime, and that it has
to be punished like a crime, but here there is an absolute idea that it would be unlikely for a
doctor to be punished or jailed for an abortion… Everyone knows that there’s this reality, like
corruption” (Author Interview with Rodriguez, January 12, 2017).
Although a lack of capacity or interest may play a role in why there are low levels of
regulation of the black market for abortion in Chile, there are clearly areas of the market where
the government does have the capacity and the information to intervene, but chooses instead to
wait for someone else to denounce these sellers, or to ignore the problem entirely. In relation to
this phenomenon, Perry comments:
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Nobody wants to ask about it or take charge. Because to ask and find it generates a
responsibility that’s big. To find the problem and the source and confront it isn’t hard, but
I don’t think the government wants to take the responsibility to regulate it (Author
Interview with Perry, January 18, 2017).
This comment exemplifies the “política del avestruz,” because it acknowledges that
government officials do not want to see the problem of the black market, because it would
require action and confrontation, which is partially against their political interests. As a result,
the alterative hypothesis of a lack of capacity to regulate the black market for medical abortion in
Chile may be able to explain part of the reason why there are lower levels of government
regulation than one would expect, but it is not the only reason why there is almost complete
impunity for this black market. In order to fully explain these low levels of regulation, the
hypothesis of bureaucratic norms must also be entertained, as it plays an important role in
explaining this Chilean phenomenon.

Conclusion:
In this chapter, I responded to the questions: why has the government been unable or
unwilling to regulate the black market for abortion in Chile, and what motivates government
officials to engage in a policy of weak regulation of the black market? In answering these
questions, I examined three different hypotheses for why there is weak, government regulation of
the black market, and provided evidence for the claim that this low level of regulation is based
on the contributions that the presence of the market has made towards women’s health. This
hypothesis adds to theories and literature about the reasons why governments choose to not stop
illegal activity when they have the opportunity to do so, which could potentially extend beyond
the area of the black market for medical abortion, and provide theories for why governments do
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not regulate other types of markets or illegal activities. In the next chapter, I seek to answer
another important question related to Chile’s black market for medical abortion: In a situation
where there is a lack of formal, government regulation of an illegal activity, how do other actors
step in to informally regulate this practice, and how has this informal regulation occurred in the
case of the black market for abortion in Chile?
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CHAPTER 6: THE INFORMAL REGULATION OF THE BLACK MARKET FOR
MEDICAL ABORTION IN CHILE

The past few chapters have described how the black market for abortion in Chile is
characterized by a lack of formal, governmental regulation. Although there is little formal
regulation of this market, to fill this vacuum, a variety of NGOs have emerged with the mission
of providing a form of informal regulation. Because the government is unable to take on the role
of “regulator” of this illegal space, and because the existence of an illegal space is also
frequently characterized by potential dangers to those that seek to access it, these NGOs have
taken on the role of informal regulators through a variety of different mechanisms. In this
scenario, I define informal regulation as the interference of non-state actors within a market,
through a variety of different mechanisms, with the efforts of trying to make this market function
more safely and effectively for the people who try to access it.
In this chapter, I seek to answer the questions: how do NGOs informally regulate the
black market, why did NGOs decide to take on the role of informally regulating the black market
for Misoprostol in Chile, and how does this informal regulation function? In answering these
questions, I first outline the dangers of an unregulated black market for Misoprostol in Chile,
which prompted NGOs to form or expand their missions to seek to regulate these unregulated
spaces. I next analyze literature about informal regulation, and the mechanisms that NGOs can
use to influence behavior, in the efforts of situating the informal regulation of the black market
for Misoprostol within this wider body of knowledge. I then use the literature about NGOs’
resources to describe the three mechanisms that Chilean NGOs have used to attempt to provide
an informal regulation of this market: regulation through scientific information, regulation
through exposure of sellers, doctors, and clinics, and regulation through price reduction of the
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medication. Within this analysis, I also highlight the work of two NGOs, Línea Aborto Libre and
Con las Amigas y en la Casa, that actively attempt to influence the black market by using these
mechanisms. The purpose of this chapter is to add complexity to our understanding about how
black markets function in the face of a lack of formal regulation, and to our knowledge about the
circumstances under which non-governmental actors move in to provide informal regulation.
This chapter also seeks to add new insights to theories about informal regulation, as abortion is
generally not studied within this context.

Dangers of an Unregulated Black Market in Chile
Although the black market for Misoprostol in Chile has served to provide many women
with access to this medication, there are many dangerous aspects of an unregulated market that
are defined by asymmetries in information. There are four main risks of an unregulated black
market for abortion in Chile: the presence of fake pills, the proliferation of false information
about the use of the drug, the existence of unsafe spaces where women may experience violence,
and the inflation of the cost of Misoprostol. In the following sections, I will address how
informal regulation is used to mitigate each of these dangers.
The first danger caused by a lack of regulation is the presence of fake pills in the black
market. As there are a large number of online websites that sell Misoprostol, it is very difficult to
control for the quality of the medication. Women are forced to pay a high price for this
medication on the black market for a quality that is not guaranteed. Angel Erpel of the feminist
organization Línea Aborto Libre comments on this danger:
The fake pills are the first danger of the black market. This happens a lot, and it’s awful.
That’s a woman’s biggest fear. Because there are many offers, but women are afraid that
they are fake (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
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Línea Aborto Libre’s manual, Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual, details the use of
Misoprostol for inducing abortions, and recounts women’s experiences with the black market. In
the case of the first danger of the black market, women are often sold pills that are not actually
Misoprostol, and instead are other drugs like aspirin. In other cases, women may request the
medication through the mail, but either receive an empty box, or pay for the medication but
never receive it. One testimony from Línea Aborto Libre: El Manual recounts: “I bought them
through the Internet and they tricked me, they were fake” (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012).
Apart from losing money and having to contact another supplier for the medication, the
danger of receiving fake pills is that it may extend the amount of time that a woman is forced to
wait before she can abort. Misoprostol is safest and most effective when used up to the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy. After twelve weeks, the risk of complications increases greatly, and
the dosage of Misoprostol may need to be increased (Gómez 2015, 5). Consequently, it is
recommended that after twelve weeks, women should only use Misoprostol for abortion in the
presence of medical professionals (Línea Aborto Libre Manual). However, if a woman is sent
fake pills, she may need to wait for weeks until a new supply arrives, which could put her life in
danger. Casas and Vivaldi recounted a case where one woman was sold fake pills and had to wait
for four weeks until a new box of pills arrived, pushing her pregnancy to fifteen weeks. As this
case was a later pregnancy, the supplier sold her a dosage that was much too high, and after
consulting a doctor, she was told that the dosage could have killed her (Casas and Vivaldi 2014,
74).
The second danger of the black market is that within this market there is a proliferation of
incorrect information and instructions about the use of Misoprostol. One of the elements of
incorrect information is that some sellers tell women that they either need to use too many or too
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few pills to abort. FLAGSOG reports that nine out of ten women successfully abort using twelve
pills (which is the recommended dosage and does not require medical attention afterwards).
However, many venders sell women four to eight pills, informing them that this is the correct
dosage. In reality, a dose of four pills is considered by experts as an “unsafe abortion,” as it is
unlikely that a woman will fully abort through this small number of pills, and a dose of eight
pills often requires medical attention following the abortion (subjecting women to legal dangers),
as the abortions are often not fully complete (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012). On the other
hand, if a woman is given too high a dosage of Misoprostol, this can also put her life in danger.
In relation to the danger of inaccurate information about the correct dosage of Misoprostol,
Angela Erpel commented: “In our manual, we have cases of women who had abortions and
didn’t know how to do it. They were informed by the seller to take two pills, to take it vaginally,
and to lift their legs” (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
There are many cases of Misoprostol sellers telling women absurd instructions about
physical actions that they need to do after taking Misoprostol to attain an abortion, such as lifting
their legs above their head, not eating, or doing a variety of different exercises (Author Interview
with Anonymous, February 14, 2017). However, the bigger danger for Chilean women (in terms
of future repercussions) is when they are instructed to take the medication vaginally instead of
orally. Although this method is equally as effective as the oral method, if a woman has taken
Misoprostol vaginally and needs to go to the hospital for abortion-related complications within
four days of taking the pills, the remains of the medication will still be detectable, and she could
be prosecuted. In contrast, it is not possible to detect Misoprostol if it has been taken orally
(Manual Línea Aborto Libre, 23). Consequently, Línea Aborto Libre only instructs women on
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taking Misoprostol orally, in the efforts to mitigate the legal risk of denouncement (Author
Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
The documentary, La Línea del Aborto, shows a clip of an employee from the hotline
contacting a male seller of Misoprostol, and asking him about instructions for taking the drug. In
the clip, the seller repeatedly tells her that four pills are the correct dosage, and that she should
take the pills vaginally. When the employee asks the seller about the possibility that doctors
could discover the remains of the medication if she has abortion-related complications, he tells
her that she should wait three days with the infection before going to the doctor- an answer that if
followed would put a woman’s life at risk (Rist and Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016). From these
interviews and first-hand accounts, it is clear that in many cases, the sellers of Misoprostol on the
traditional black market are ill-informed about the correct usage of the medication, thereby
putting Chilean women’s lives at risk.
The third danger of the black market for Misoprostol is the creation of unsafe spaces
where women may be exposed to additional harm. As the sale of Misoprostol is an illegal
transaction, women are put in a vulnerable position where their safety may be placed in jeopardy.
I define these unsafe spaces as areas where women may be exposed to physical or psychological
harm in relation to their purchase or use of Misoprostol. These unsafe spaces can include both
the interactions between women and the sellers of Misoprostol within the black market, and the
hospitals or clinics where they may seek care for abortion-related complications. In these
hospitals, women may be exposed to physical or psychological danger, as they may be forced to
testify against themselves before receiving care, or may be the target of psychological abuse
from their nurses or doctors (which will be described in greater detail below). In relation to the
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first unsafe space (within the black market itself), Maria Jose, member of the feminist collective,
Con las Amigas y en la Casa, stated:
It’s just a business, and with all of the risks that come with illegality. It’s almost like the
drug market. Women are very vulnerable and could receive sexual or psychological
violence (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017).

Casas and Vivaldi echoed this sentiment, and recounted how in one of their interviews
with a Chilean healthcare provider who advises his patients about the use of Misoprostol, the
provider told them that three of his patients had been asked for sex in exchange for receiving an
abortion (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 74). From these accounts, it appears that within the
unregulated black market for abortion in Chile, women may experience damaging physical and
psychological violence. Moreover, the illegality of Misoprostol creates a second unsafe space
where women may experience this type of violence: within the hospitals and clinics where they
seek treatment for abortion-related complications.
Although under Article 342 of Chile’s Penal Code it is illegal for a doctor to force
women, who arrive at a hospital seeking care for abortion-related complications, to confess to
inducing their abortions, there are still many cases where healthcare providers have forced
women to confess, or tricked them into confessing because these women did not know their
rights (Ord A15 Número 1404, 2014). Women Behind Bars’ report on abortion prosecutions
found that in their court statements, many women complained about being badly treated by
healthcare professionals. Furthermore, this report found that these complaints were not isolated
cases, and in fact, were made in all of the Chilean cities where they conducted their research:
Santiago, Arica, Valparaíso, and Temuco. In these cases, healthcare professionals played a
variety of roles in this physiological ill-treatment of these women, from forcing women to
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confess and telling them that they would not receive treatment until they did, to chastising and
shaming them for their abortions, to arguing vehemently that their patients had abortions as
opposed to miscarriages (although all of these actions violate doctor-patient confidentially)
(Women Behind Bars 1998, 54-55). In one extreme case, two women in Santiago were beaten by
a healthcare professional to force their confessions (Casas-Becerra 1997, 34).
The consequences of this ill-treatment and abuse are not only the physical and
psychological damage that these women receive, but also the delay in treatment that results from
women’s fear of mistreatment and prosecution within hospital settings. Women Behind Bars
reports that this fear can cause a variety of dangerous and life-threating behaviors from delays in
treatment, to flight from hospitals, to suicide (Women Behind Bars 1998, 53). Furthermore, this
danger of the black market also highlights the inequality intrinsic to access to abortion in Chile,
as in both the Casas-Becerra study and the Women Behind Bars study, all of the denouncements
came from public hospitals, and all of the women who were reported were poor, and largely
could not or did not know how to defend their rights (Women Behind Bars 1998, 52; Casas
Becerra 1997, 33). Therefore, the creation of unsafe spaces, and the harms that this produces, is a
third danger and by-product of the black market for abortion, and the illegality of this practice in
Chile.
The final danger of an unregulated black market for abortion in Chile is the exorbitant
price of abortions. Casas and Vivaldi report that Chile’s abortion ban has fueled a demand in the
market for abortions, which healthcare professionals and black market sellers have moved in to
fill. Due to this large demand, these actors are able to charge large sums of money for abortions,
in some cases up to five thousand dollars. In one case, a doctor forced a woman to pay extra
money for her abortion after learning that she was the daughter of a wealthy public figure. As
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abortion is illegal, women are unable to report abuse by healthcare providers or medical
professionals, exacerbating their state of vulnerability. Casas and Vivaldi argue that in this sense
“illegality makes for good business” (Casas and Vivaldi 2014, 73). This illegality makes the
black market for abortion a very attractive market for the male sellers who dominate it, as they
can earn around 500% profit by charging a high price for the medications that are oftentimes
fake, or are not a complete dosage (Rist and Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016). The higher the
price of Misoprostol, the more inaccessible abortion is for poor Chilean women, leading to an
increased risk that they will resort to dangerous and life-threating methods to induce their
abortions.
Having described the four main dangers of an unregulated market for abortion in Chile, I
will now conduct a literature review of informal regulation, and the mechanisms that NGOs use
to influence behavior. This literature review will provide theories about NGOs’ tools, which will
be incorporated into the next section about the mechanisms that Chilean NGOs have used to
respond to the dangers that exist within the black market for medical abortion in Chile.

Literature Review of NGOs’ Mechanisms of Influence
NGOs have a variety of mechanisms that they use to influence behavior. The two main
mechanisms that scholars argue NGOs use to impact behavior are issue framing and agenda
setting, and information provision. In the case of the black market for medical abortion, although
Chilean NGOs do not use issue framing or agenda setting to influence behaviors in the black
market, they do engage in a process of information provision. Furthermore, these NGOs also use
a third mechanism, which is generally not viewed as part of NGOs’ resources, which is the
manipulation of the market through flooding it with Misoprostol, thereby reducing the cost of the
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drug. This activity can be viewed as another form of information provision because it changes
the signals within the market about the price of the medication, thereby encouraging sellers to
reduce their price as well. This section will outline the literary debate about NGOs’ mechanisms
of influencing behaviors, highlighting current theories about the three mechanisms that will be
described in greater detail below.
The first mechanism that scholars argue NGOs use to impact behavior is issue framing
and agenda setting. Issue framing is the process whereby actors “render events or occurrences
meaningful,” thereby strategically interpreting events to gain support for a particular issue (Snow
et al. 1986, 464). NGOs use framing to mobilize a broad base of support for a movement or
objective, and attempt to package an issue in a way that resonates with a large sector of the
population (Jutta 2007, 22). For example, in the case of the antipersonnel landmine ban within
the UN, NGOs were able to take the military issue of antipersonnel landmines (APLs), and
publicize the issue with a humanitarian focus, thereby inciting outrage within the international
community about the human toll of these weapons (Rutherford 2000, 80). NGOs are also often
able to use issue framing to influence agenda setting. Schattschneider argues that “some issues
are organized into politics, while others are organized out,” meaning that one of NGOs’
mechanisms of influence is through putting an issue on the political agenda, which normally
would not be included (Schattschneider 1960, 8). For example, in the case of APLs, NGOs were
able to publicize this issue, gaining attention from the public, thereby putting the issue of APLs
on the international agenda (Rutherford 2000, 79).
However, although issue framing and agenda setting are important mechanisms that
NGOs use to guide behaviors, these resources were not used by Chilean NGOs in the case of the
informal regulation of the black market for abortion in Chile. The mechanisms of issue framing
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and agenda setting are more often used to influence political debate and the behaviors of
politicians, whereas Chilean NGOs were attempting to influence the behaviors of non-state
actors within the black market for Misoprostol. Consequently, the mechanisms that these NGOs
used in this informal regulation fall under the second category of NGOs’ resources: information
provision. NGOs are often able to engage in information provision because they can provide
expertise on a particular topic, and can take on the role of informal monitor of a certain actor’s
behaviors. Scholars have argued that “the ultimate innate resource of NGOs is their expertise”
(Joachim 2007, 36). NGOs can provide a variety of different information about issues, such as
scientific knowledge, which is viewed as credible and reliable, as a way of holding actors
accountable (Joachim 2007, 36). NGOs can also take on a form of information provision which
involves “naming and shaming,” whereby they “informally” regulate actors through providing
information to the public through public disclosures of these actors’ behaviors (Kathura 2006,
404).
For example, in the case of polluting industries in India, NGOs and the press have acted
as “informal regulators” in cases where formal regulation is weak or non-existent, through a
variety of forms such as information provision. Kathuria found that in India, the press
successfully acted as an informal regulator of pollution by publishing articles about polluters’
emission levels and public interest cases, thereby providing the public with information about
their activities, in the efforts to hold them accountable (Kathura 2006, 404). NGOs in Chile have
also used this form of information provision as a way of informally regulating the black market
for Misoprostol. Chilean NGOs use the mechanisms of first providing women with information
about the correct use of Misoprostol, and second, encouraging women to “name and shame”
venders, doctors, and hospitals that have treated them badly. However, Chilean NGOs use this
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method of information provision as informal regulation differently than the cases described
above, as their goal is to make an activity safer and more effective for the women who attempt to
access it, whereas NGOs typically use information provision to influence industries or
policymakers to change their behaviors.
The third type of mechanism of information provision that is not described in literature
about the resources that NGOs use to influence behavior, but is an important tool of Chilean
NGOs, is flooding the market with Misoprostol to reduce the price of the medication. This third
mechanism, which will be described in greater detail below, is influential within the scholarly
debate about the ways in which NGOs can have an impact on behaviors because it assumes a
different, more active type of role for NGOs. This third type of mechanism could also be present
in other circumstances outside of the ones described in this thesis. Having engaged in the
scholarly debate about NGOs’ mechanisms for shaping behaviors, this thesis will next describe
and analyze the three types of mechanisms of information provision that NGOs have used to
informally regulate the black market for Misoprostol in Chile: regulation through information,
exposure, and price reduction.

NGOs’ Three Mechanisms of Informal Regulation
From the four dangers of an unregulated market described above, it is clear that women
who attempt to access this black market may be exposed to a variety of harms due to the illegal
status of this exchange. As seen in the last chapter, the Chilean government is unable and
unwilling to regulate this market, or mitigate the asymmetries of information and dangers that
characterize its presence in Chile. Consequently, NGOs have developed three mechanisms,
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which can all be characterized as “information provision,” in the efforts to mitigate some of the
dangers of this black market, and make it function in a manner that is more effective and secure.

Regulating the market through scientific information
The first mechanism that NGOs use to informally regulate the black market is the
provision of accurate, scientific information to women who wish to access this market. In the
case of the second danger, the prevalence of incorrect information and instructions about the use
of Misoprostol, and the medication’s illegal status, mean that it is unlikely that the Ministry of
Health would formally regulate this market by proliferating information to the Chilean
population about how and when to take Misoprostol, and what to do if complications arise. As a
result, two Chilean NGOs, Línea Aborto Libre and Con las Amigas y en la Casa, formed with the
mission of accompanying women who want to abort using Misoprostol. These NGOs function by
providing women with advice and scientific information throughout the process of aborting.
Although Línea Aborto Libre and Con las Amigas y en la Casa are the main NGOs that provide
the service of informally regulating through information sharing, Women Help Women, Women
on Web, and a variety of smaller organizations and campaigns such as Miso para Todas and Yo
Decido also act as informal regulators of the black market by providing accurate and safe
information about the use of Misoprostol to induce abortion.
Línea Aborto Libre was founded as an organization in 2012, and works through the
collective Lesbianas y Feministas (Lesbians and Feminists). Línea Aborto Libre uses a variety of
strategies to informally regulate the black market by providing accurate information to women
who seek it: through their hotline, their creation and distribution of the Manual Línea Aborto
Chile: El Manual, their social media presence (website, Facebook page, and twitter), and their

104

workshops (http://infoabortochile.org/, 2007). In 2012, Línea Aborto Libre emerged from Línea
Aborto Chile, which began in 2009 in Concepción. Once Línea Aborto Libre separated from
Línea Aborto Chile, it moved its headquarters to Santiago, although it also has an office in
Iquique and a variety of “compañeras” in Valparaíso and Valdivia. Línea Aborto Libre functions
through funding from the Safe Abortion Access Fund, although its employees are essentially
volunteers (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
The first method that Línea Aborto Libre uses to informally regulate the black market for
Misoprostol, through the provision of scientific information, is through their hotline. As Línea
Aborto Libre’s employees and volunteers are part-time, its hotline functions from 8pm to 11pm,
from Monday to Friday. One of Línea Aborto Libre’s future goals is to create an automatic
answering system that would function twenty-four hours a day, so that women would be able to
receive constant information and help (http://infoabortochile.org/, 2007). On average, the hotline
receives 10-15 calls a day from women who want information about using Misoprostol, in
addition to the numerous requests for information that they receive from email and Facebook.
Additionally, Línea Aborto Libre also provides in-person meetings for more complicated cases.
Línea Aborto Libre’s hotline helps to solve the second danger of the black market, the high
amounts of fake information and lack of safe instructions about the use of Misoprostol, by
providing women with personal care and answers to their questions throughout their abortion
process as a form of accompaniment. In order for this NGO to be able to function legally, it does
not provide women with Misoprostol or any other abortion-inducing medications (Author
Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017). Rather, Línea Aborto Libre follows a strict protocol,
and only shares information with women above the age of eighteen: “We don’t say, ‘Sophia you
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have to do this…’ we say, ‘women have aborted in the following ways…’” (Author Interview
with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
The second way that Línea Aborto Libre helps to mitigate the second danger of the black
market is through their manual, Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual. Línea Aborto Libre released
their manual in 2012, basing it off of an Argentine NGO’s (Lesbianas y Feministas por la
Descriminalización del Aborto en Argentina) manual, Todo lo que querés saber sobre cómo
hacerse un aborto con pastillas (Everything that you want to know about how to do an abortion
with pills), but adapting it to Chile’s political and cultural context (Línea Aborto Chile: El
Manual 2012, 2). Línea Aborto Libre initially printed 1,000 copies of their manual, and made it
available for free through their website. The manual includes four chapters: the legality of
abortion in Chile, how to abort using Misoprostol, testimonies from women who have aborted
using Misoprostol, and the depenalization of abortion in Chile. Línea Aborto Libre’s goal in
creating this manual was: “To bring information to those women that don’t have easy access to
the internet, many times don’t have enough money to make a phone call, or that require more
detailed information about how to abort with pills” (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012, 6).
In creating this manual, Línea Aborto Libre has taken a step in informally regulating the
black market by providing clear, scientific information about how Misoprostol should be used,
and what the pills should look like, thereby correcting many of the misunderstandings and
falsehoods that surround this illegal context. This action is a form of informal regulation because
it attempts to make the black market for Misoprostol function more effectively by providing
women with the necessary information to be able to determine that the products that they are
receiving are not fake. This black market is characterized by asymmetries in information, which
Línea Aborto Libre attempts to correct by ensuring that women are more informed.

106

The final way that Línea Aborto Libre provides information to Chilean women is through
their social media presence and workshops. Línea Aborto Libre manages a Facebook page,
website, and twitter where it keeps women updated about its workshops, provides them with
accurate information about how to access the NGO, posts articles and updates about the
decriminalization of therapeutic abortion in Chile, and provides a space for women to directly
contact them to ask for advice or help. In 2014, Línea Aborto Libre also began a public
workshop series in a variety of cities throughout Chile, with topics such as “sexual health and
safe abortions.” These workshops are another way that Línea Aborto Libre provides information
about Misoprostol and about women’s interactions with the black market to the general public,
as a way of combatting the black market’s spread of false information
(http://infoabortochile.org/, 2007). Through their hotline, manual, and media presence, Línea
Aborto Libre is able to informally regulate the black market for Misoprostol by mitigating the
danger of false information.
The second Chilean NGO that works to informally regulate the black market through
information is Con las Amigas y en la Casa. Con las Amigas y en la Casa is a feminist network
that functions through email and Facebook, and accompanies women who want to abort using
Misoprostol. María Jose, an employee of Con las Amigas y en la Casa stated: “We provide
information about how to conduct abortions safely and freely…this network emerged in a
context where abortion is prohibited in all circumstances, and with the need to face the illegal
market for Misoprostol, and to provide information and accompaniment for women who decide
to abort” (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017).
This NGO formed as a way of combatting the dangers of the black market for
Misoprostol through providing accurate information to women about the use of Misoprostol.
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There are twenty women who work for Con las Amigas y en la Casa. They receive about twenty
emails a day, and between September and January, they completed around 1,000 abortion
accompaniments (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017). Con las Amigas y en la Casa
also runs an active Facebook page where they post about their work. Additionally, in March,
they held the “Escuela para mujeres acompañantes de abortos con pastillas” (School for female
accompaniments of abortions with pills), for women throughout Chile who wanted to learn how
to help other women abort using Misoprostol, or who wanted to start their own feminist
collectives, as a way of spreading knowledge about how to safely abort with medications
(Facebook page Con las amigas y en la Casa, 2017). Through their accompaniment and “school,”
they are able to disseminate information to women about the correct use of Misoprostol, thereby
informally regulating and monitoring the information that emerges from the black market.
There are a few smaller Chilean websites and campaigns, such as yo decido (I decide)
that also work to inform women about the correct use of Misoprostol. Additionally, international
NGOs, like Women Help Women and Women on Web, have websites that contain similar
instructions, testimonies, and FAQs.

Basically, we provide information and we accompany women. What we do is difficult
especially with the parallel market, as women write us with questions because the seller
gave them fake instructions or fake drugs. Or if the drugs were real, they gave bad
information so the drug didn’t work (Author Interview with Anonymous, February 14,
2017).

As a whole, this group of Chilean NGOs, Chilean websites, and international
organizations are able to work together to reduce the black market’s risks, through the
mechanisms of the provision of accurate, scientific information about the use of Misoprostol.
These collectives provide a role and service that would be unattainable for the Chilean
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government to deliver, and through information are able to improve the safety and effectiveness
of this activity.

Regulating the market through exposure
The second mechanism that Chilean NGOs use to act as informal regulators of the black
market for Misoprostol through information provision is by encouraging women to expose
sellers and doctors who have mistreated them. In this way, these NGOs are able to tackle two
other dangers of the black market: the existence of false pills, and the presence of unsafe spaces
where women who seek Misoprostol or treatment may be exposed to physical or psychological
harm. Línea Aborto Libre is the main NGO that does this work of publishing lists of places
where women have been treated badly, as one of its employee describes: “On our webpage, we
tell women to denounce all of the fake sellers and clinics that treat them badly, where they were
discriminated against, or where they were denounced…We also tell women through the webpage
to publish fake advertisements” (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
Through using social media, (their webpage and Facebook account), Línea Aborto Libre
creates an online space where women can share their experiences with the black market, and
with seeking care for abortion-related complications. Through this space, women can warn other
women about clinics and doctors who have either treated them badly, or denounced them to the
police, which is one of Chilean women’s largest fears when they seek care. In one case, the
documentary La Línea del Aborto recounted a situation where a woman was told by a seller to
take Misoprostol vaginally, and experienced complications:

My pregnancy was also advanced, so it was complicated. I was bleeding, I had a fever,
and I was alone. And I went to a hospital and the doctor asked me a lot of questions.

109

Before giving me pills or saving my life they called the police and I was arrested (Rist
and Chartier & Lopez Escrivá, 2016).

Through the creation of a forum that exposes hospitals and doctors, such as the one
described above, Línea Aborto Libre helps to ensure that women get the care that they need, and
feel comfortable seeking help when their lives are at risk. To further ensure that women are not
ill-treated if they go to a hospital, Línea Aborto Libre’s manual has a chapter dedicated to
detailing a woman’s rights to care, highlighting activities that are classified as “medical
violence,” such as forcing a woman to confess if she has had an abortion, refusing to provide
care to a sick woman, or insulting her, and instructing women on how to expose medical
violence (Línea Aborto Chile: El Manual 2012, 25). In this way, women can be more informed
about their rights when they visit a hospital, and will be more able to protect themselves from illtreatment or denouncements in situations of emergency.
Línea Aborto Libre’s online website and Facebook page also allow them to address the
danger of the presence of fake medications and fake websites. As Misoprostol has become a
more lucrative medication, there has been a proliferation of websites, some of them real, some
not, claiming to sell the medication. As the use of Misoprostol for aborting is time-sensitive, it
can be dangerous if a woman is sent fake pills, because she may have to wait two to three weeks
to receive a new shipment, which may push her pregnancy past the twelve-week period where
the use of Misoprostol is considered safest and most effective. To combat this risk, Línea Aborto
Libre encourages women to expose fake webpages and sellers of fake medications:
It’s called a funa when many people get together and denounce a person. When there is a
fake seller we publish it on Facebook and on the webpage, it’s the most that we can do.
We tell women that they are the ones that have to do it, we can’t expect the government
to do anything (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).
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Through their “funa,” Línea Aborto Libre provides a space to warn other women about
abuses that they have experienced, which is a service that would be difficult for the government
to deliver. Although government agencies, such as the Ministry of Health, are able to instruct
doctors and hospitals about their obligations to respect doctor-patient confidentiality, and
encourage them not to report women who have aborted, it is unlikely that the Ministry of Health
would publish a list of clinics that have denounced women or treated women badly who have
aborted, as in many cases, they may not know or have proof that medical violence was
perpetrated. Furthermore, as the sale of Misoprostol is illegal, it is even less likely that the
government would know about or publish a list of sellers who sold women fake drugs (as women
are legally unable to report these cases to the government without being charged for abortion).
Consequently, the only way to regulate this market is through these informal forums provided by
NGOs, such as Línea Aborto Libre, which act as cites of information provision by warning
women about dangerous spaces that exist within the market.

Regulating the market through price reduction
Chilean NGOs’ final mechanism for informally regulating the black market for
Misoprostol in Chile, through information provision, is through flooding the market to reduce the
cost of the medication. The final danger of the black market for Misoprostol is the high price that
sellers are able to charge because they are part of an illicit activity. As Maria Jose, employee of
Con las Amigas y en La Casa stated:
It’s a very attractive market, run by men. Most that have no responsibility for selling the
medications, they just do it to make money. So, they speculate with the prices of the
medications. We’ve had cases where women have paid 400,000 pesos for a dose…for an
abortion that isn’t even guaranteed because the sellers make no promises, so there are
many cases of fake medications (Author Interview with José, January 12, 2017).
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There are cases where men have charged 50,000 Chilean pesos (about $80) for four pills
of Misoprostol, which is only a third of the recommended dosage (Rist and Chartier & Lopez
Escrivá, 2016). This price inflation can be dangerous for women who seek Misoprostol because
for many Chileans, the black market is their only way to access the medication, and if they are
unable to pay, they may be forced to resort to riskier methods of aborting. Angela Erpel of Línea
Aborto Libre commented:

Access right now is the main barrier because now there is more information. The main
risks are internet scams and the price. In some cases, it’s very high. You can get Miso for
$30, and on the internet sometimes they sell it for $500, which is a huge difference
(Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).

As price inflation is one of the main risks of the black market for Misoprostol,
international NGOs, such as Women Help Women and a few Chilean NGOs, have banded
together to reduce the price of the medication on the black market. By providing Misoprostol to
women for a fraction of the cost on the black market (Women on Web encourages women to pay
from 70-90 euros for a complete dosage, although they provide the pills for free or for a reduced
price if women are unable to pay), this action has forced sellers in the black market to reduce the
price of their medications in response (https://www.womenonweb.org/ 2017). Angela Erpel
explains this phenomenon:

Now there are more offers through the internet, and there are many offers through
feminist networks. Thanks to the feminist networks, the price of Misoprostol dropped.
Before it was a minimum of two salaries, like $500 for a dose, and it’s not worth this, it’s
much cheaper. And before it was only men who sold it. So, the feminists mobilized
because the medication is cheap in other Latin American countries with a prescription,
and one can get it easily (Author Interview with Erpel, January 25, 2017).

112

By mobilizing to provide women with a greater access to this medication, national and
international NGOs have successfully reduced the high price of the drug, thereby informally
regulating the price on the black market, and ensuring that a larger portion of Chilean women
can access medical abortions. By flooding the market with Misoprostol, NGOs use a form of
information provision by changing the signals about the price of the drug. Through this final
mechanism, these NGOs manipulate the black market in a way that is completely unavailable to
government officials, thereby providing an informal service to the Chilean population.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigated the four main dangers of the presence of an unregulated
black market in Chile, and I examined the three mechanisms that NGOs use to informally
regulate this market: through providing scientific information about the market, creating a space
for exposures, and reducing the price of the medication. In describing the work of these NGOs, I
highlighted how each of these areas of informal regulation are services that the Chilean
government is unable to provide to its population, based on the illegal characteristics of the black
market, and how each of these services is essential to mitigating the risks of the black market for
Misoprostol. Having described the ways in which NGOs’ involvement in the black market for
medical abortion in Chile can be understood as a type of informal regulation, in the face of the
government’s inability and disinterest in regulating this market, in the next chapter I conclude by
describing how this thesis can be understood in relation to a broader literature about black
markets, decisions to regulate or not regulate illegal activity, and theories about informal
regulation of illegal spaces and activities. In this final chapter, I also provide a short overview of
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the current status of the therapeutic abortion bill in Chile, and how if this bill were passed, it
could affect the black market for Misoprostol and the regulation of this market.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have attempted to analyze the multidimensional aspects of the regulation
of the black market for abortion in Chile. In making the argument that this black market exists in
a space of formal and informal regulation, I have attempted to highlight the complexities within
this market, and demonstrate that in this case, non-governmental actors have emerged to take on
many of the roles that the government is either unable or unwilling to assume. To create a
context for this argument, in Chapter 2, I described the history of abortion and abortion law in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Chile. In Chapter 3, I outlined the structure of the black
market for Misoprostol in Chile, and the functioning of this market. Having created a context for
analyzing the regulation of this market, Chapter 4 examined the ways that the regulation of this
black market actually occurs, and Chapter 5 created an argument for why the government is
unable and unwilling to regulate the black market; this market saves the government lives and
money. Finally, in Chapter 6, I examined the emergence of a variety of non-governmental actors
that assume regulatory roles that are unavailable to the government, in the efforts to make this
market function better (and more safely).
In this final, concluding chapter, I first seek to situate this thesis within a larger body of
literature on informal regulation and government regulation to highlight the theoretical
implications of my findings. I argue that this thesis contributes to academic discussions about
these concepts, as the topic of the regulation of the black market for medical abortion is a littlestudied phenomenon, which could provide insight into the functioning and regulation of other
illegal markets, adding to pre-existing theories. I next describe the ways in which this thesis
could be extended, areas of future research in this area, and potential limitations of this thesis.
Finally, I highlight two other important aspects of reproductive health in Chile that are currently
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being discussed within the government, and could have implications for the black market for
abortion: the Ley de Tres Causales (therapeutic abortion bill), and sexual education reform.

Theoretical Implications
There are three main theoretical implications of this thesis: implications for theories
about black markets, theories about government regulation, and theories about informal
regulation. There is a large amount of research dedicated to the study of black markets, and to
the reasons why these black markets form. Authors such as Portes and Castellas and Yashar
write about the emergence of black markets as being linked to economic crises and
industrialization, and about the negative effects of these markets, such as the creation of gangs
(Portes and Castellas 1989; Yasar 2013). However, the black market for Misoprostol is a very
different type of black market than the market for illegal drugs or unlicensed taxi drivers, as it
involves a different variety of actors and motivations.
The government regulation of the black market for Misoprostol is different than the
regulation of most illegal markets because in most cases, actors like governmental figures or
NGOs would not want to make the illegal market more accessible for the people who attempt to
access it. In the majority of cases of illegal activity, such as the sale of illegal drugs, there is the
assumption that these markets are bad, or at least neutral. In contrast, although there is a strong
divide surrounding opinions about the issue of abortion, there are also government officials who
believe that the existence of the black market for Misoprostol serves an important, positive
purpose, which essentially no bureaucrats would say about the market for cocaine or heroin.
Although in some cases, government officials may become co-opted into illegal activity,
allowing it to exist with little regulation, these officials would still not believe that the presence
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of this illegal market had a positive effect on society. As a result, this illegal market takes on a
distinct role in society from the role of most illegal markets, and therefore does not fit within the
majority of literature about the influences of black markets on society, and the reasons why
government officials may be unable or unwilling to regulate them. Because there is little in-depth
research on this type of black market, this thesis works to expand our understanding of black
markets, and our conception of the circumstances under which they emerge.
The second theoretical implication of this thesis is for theories about weak government
regulation. Dominant theories, such as those proposed by Gill, argue that deficiencies in the
regulation of black markets result from a lack of state capacity (Gill 2002). However, as I have
argued, this situation is not the explanation for the Chilean case. The arguments in this thesis are
closest to those proposed by Holland’s theory of forbearance, as they also argue that government
actors are responding to outside motivations when they purposefully decide to not regulate
illegal activity. However, the arguments made in this thesis about bureaucratic incentives are
also distinct from Holland’s argument of forbearance, because she focuses on how bureaucrats
decide to ignore illegal activity as a means of economic redistribution, with the purpose of
gaining electoral support from poor populations (Holland 2016, 233-4).
However, in the case of the regulation of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile, there
does not appear to be an electoral motivation for the lack of regulation, as neither Chilean
women nor sellers in this black market have made the connection that this lack of regulation is a
purposeful electoral tool, and therefore do not vote for politicians based on this factor.
Furthermore, in the case of the black market for Misoprostol, bureaucrats’ incentives and
motivations for not regulating this market are distinct from the bureaucrats’ motivations within
Holland’s theory of forbearance. In the case of the black market for Misoprostol, bureaucrats are
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influenced by both their bureaucratic norms and monetary incentives (reduced hospital costs) to
not enforce regulatory policies, which are clearly different incentives than those presented within
Holland’s model. This thesis adds new insights to theories, such as Holland’s, because it
demonstrates how government officials may also act in response to monetary incentives, and in
accordance with their bureaucratic norms, in their decisions to not regulate black markets. It is
possible that these theories could also apply to other cases where government actors purposefully
decide that not upholding a law is in their interest.
The final theoretical implication of this thesis is in the area of theories about informal
regulation and NGOs’ resources. As described in Chapter 6, the majority of the research on
informal regulation focuses on cases of environmental regulation, and does not investigate the
possibility of informal regulation in the instance of black markets. Consequently, this thesis can
greatly add to literature about when, how, why, and by whom informal regulation takes place.
Moreover, this thesis extends theories about NGOs’ resources in influencing polices, particularly
in the area of using NGOs’ resources to flood the market for illegal medications, thereby
reducing their price.
The majority of literature about the resources that NGOs have available to them focuses
on their ability to use shaming, frame development and agenda setting, and transnational
networks to influence policymakers or to act as informal regulators. However, the resource of
flooding the market, as a type of information provision, is an activity that is generally viewed as
part of the state’s or suppliers’ domain. In this case, we have seen that NGOs used this tool to
influence venders to reduce the price of their medications, thereby making it more accessible to
poor women. This theory therefore adds a new type of resource to NGOs’ arsenal, and it would
be interesting to study if NGOs have used this resource in other situations as a means of
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influence. Having described the theoretical implications of this thesis, I will now discuss
potential areas for future research in this topic.

Areas of Future Research
As this topic, in the context of Chile, has largely been unstudied, there are many areas
where this thesis could be extended, or other aspects of the black market that could be
investigated, which was not possible given my limited month-long fieldwork and year-long
thesis experience. The first area for future research of this topic would be in seeing if the
arguments and theories expressed within this thesis could be extended to other countries and
contexts in the world, to determine in what ways the Chilean case is similar and different to these
other environments. In future research, it would be important to determine if this lack of
government regulation of the black market is unique to Chile, or if it is a worldwide
phenomenon, as one would assume that the introduction of Misoprostol in almost any country
where abortion is restricted would lead to lower abortion-related complications and mortality
rates. It would also be interesting to determine if informal regulation has emerged in other
countries in response to strict abortion laws, although the Chilean case is likely one of the most
extreme cases since abortion is not permitted under any circumstances. It is possible that the
groups that act as informal regulators could also look different depending on the country where
they are located and the history of that country, as Chile currently exists with relatively weak
feminist networks and civil society organizations, following the Pinochet dictatorship. An
interesting point of comparison could be examining the roles that NGOs are able to assume as
regulators in countries, such as Chile, that have experienced harsh dictatorships. It would also be
interesting to extend these theories to other types of black markets, potentially for other types of
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medications, drugs, or illegal activities, to determine under what contexts governments are most
strict on enforcing regulations, and in what circumstances NGOs tend to emerge to act as
informal regulators of these markets.
Additionally, there are other aspects of the black market for Misoprostol in Chile that
could be interesting to investigate, or further examine, for which my limited time in Chile did not
allow. One of these aspects, which could be more of an anthropology-focused study, would be
investigating more about how Misoprostol enters Chile through the black market, and about the
types of actors who engage in these activities. Although there are a few interviews with Chilean
men who bring Misoprostol into Chile from neighboring countries (such as in the documentary
La Línea del Aborto), within the academic world, there is an overall lack of knowledge and
uncertainty surrounding how Misoprostol enters Chile, and the process that interactions within
this black market take. An interesting study could be to spend time in border cities, such as
Talca, Peru, where a large portion of the Misoprostol that enters Chile comes from, and to
conduct fieldwork among the people who run this black market. The purpose of this study would
be to answer questions about how these transactions occur, how similar or different they are to
other types of drug trading, and how these individuals conduct their operations, as a way of
developing a better understanding of the culture surrounding this market, and the actors who are
involved in this trade.
A second, more in-depth examination of the regulation of the black market could also
occur within one of the NGOs that act as informal regulators of this market. It would be
interesting to conduct fieldwork within one of these NGOs to learn more about the specifics of
how they conduct informal regulation, the networks of NGOs to which they belong, and how
their roles have evolved in response to the passage of different laws relating to reproductive
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rights in Chile. As there are few in-depth studies of this kind about the black market, these
investigations could serve to further shed light on this taboo topic, and influence policy to make
the market safer for women who attempt to access it.
A final area of this topic that deserves future research involves some of the limitations of
this thesis in studying the black market. Due to the short length of my fieldwork, there are many
important actors that I was unable to interview. Two interviews that would have contributed
greatly to my thesis were with Claudia Dides, the director of MILES Chile, an NGO that works
to provide information and research about sexual and reproductive health in Chile and create
legislative change (they have been particularly active in the debate over la Ley de Tres
Causales), and with Anita Román Morra, the president of el Colegio de Matronas de Chile (the
school of midwives in Chile). Many of my informants told me that these two actors were very
important in Chile’s reproductive health scene, and that they could provide different insights into
the functioning of the black market, and the roles of different actors within this market.
The final limitation of this thesis was that I was unable to interview anyone from the
PDI, such as from the Cybercrime Brigade or border patrol. Because I was unable to interview
these actors, my thesis ended up shifting focus from investigating the exact mechanisms by
which these actors attempted to regulate the market (and at what specific places the
implementation of this regulation was more lax than one would expect), to the reasons why there
is less regulation than expected and to informal actors’ roles in this market. However, another
study could trace out these mechanisms and interview these actors to better understand how this
regulation (or lack thereof) functions, and how different governmental actors work together in
attempting to regulate the black market. Having described the theoretical implications of this
study, and areas for future research, I will now highlight how two initiatives that the government
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is currently discussing could affect the black market for abortion in Chile: la Ley de Tres
Causales and sexual education reform.

Future Abortion-Related Government Initiatives
La Ley de Tres Causales
There is currently a bill pending in the Chilean Senate called la Ley de Tres Causales that
would seek to decriminalize abortion for therapeutic purposes. These therapeutic purposes
include providing an abortion to save a woman’s life, if the fetus is inviable (due to
malformations that are incompatible with life), or if a woman has been raped (but only up to
twelve weeks of pregnancy for women above the age of fourteen, and up to fourteen weeks for
women below the age of fourteen) (YoApoyo3Causales Website, 2017). There are many
advocates both for and against this bill. Surprisingly, some of the opponents of the bill include
both pro-life and pro-choice advocates. Pro-life opponents argue that for the first cause, a doctor
will always save a woman’s life so it is unnecessary to put this cause into law, for the second,
that doctors can make diagnostic errors and inaccurately proclaim a fetus to be inviable, and for
the third, that rape is not enough of an excuse for an abortion, and that this cause could “open the
door” to unrestricted abortions (Author Interview with Figueroa, January 19, 2017).
In contrast, pro-choice opponents cite very different reasons; they argue that the bill does
not go far enough and that abortion should be allowed in all cases, and that the bill contains
limitations that restrict a woman’s ability to access necessary care. For the first cause, the phrase
“present and future danger to a woman’s health” was eliminated and replaced with only “present
danger,” meaning that doctors could still wait too long to provide women with necessary care.
Furthermore, opponents argue that the third cause’s gestational limitations could inhibit pregnant
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adolescents from receiving care, because many women who are raped in Chile are below the age
of eighteen, and do not realize that they are pregnant until it would be too late (legally) to get an
abortion (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).
However, overall in Chile there is widespread support for the Ley de Tres Causales, as a
survey found that 69% of the Chilean population supported this bill (with 5% registering no
opinion), and that 87% of young Chileans were in favor of this project (Lezaeta and Marín,
2016). It is clear that there is a large amount of debate in Chile surrounding this controversial
bill. However, the passage of this bill could not only affect women’s access to reproductive
healthcare, but it could also have implications for the black market for abortion as well: the topic
of abortion could become less taboo, increasing the amount of information available about the
black market, there could be improvements within the healthcare system for abortion care,
updating care for black market-related abortion complications, and there could be lower levels of
government regulation of the black market.
In Chile, up until recently the topic of reproductive health, and more specifically
abortion, was infrequently discussed and was viewed as taboo. This societal view is evidenced
by the fact that between 1990 and 2014, twenty projects were created with the purpose of
decriminalizing therapeutic abortion, but none of these projects gained widespread support
(Author Interview with Soto, January 25, 2017). However, with the generational shift, more
young people are in support of reproductive health initiatives, allowing for the current initiative
to gain traction. In a self-perpetuating cycle, the press surrounding the Ley de Tres Causales
allows for a further de-stigmatization of abortion, and a democratization of information relating
to abortion. Two women from the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity who helped to create
the Ley de Tres Causales emphasized this point:
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Ten years ago, abortion was taboo… there’s a social evolution, with the governmental
and presidential support from Bachelet. The form that it was presented and the discourse
that was used has allowed us to have a conversation. We presented this law, knowing it
was polemic, and we started by discussing people’s fear and our own cultural reality,
which has allowed us to have a discussion. It has created an opening, and a place where
people can have a discussion (Author Interview with Anonymous, Ministry of Women
and Gender Equity, January 26, 2017).

Consequently, as the law allows for more discussion about the topic of abortion, it also
serves to create more information about processes related to abortion, including information
about Misoprostol and the black market. As the presence of the law in the media has spurred
more discussions about abortions, more women are beginning to ask about the black market, and
about the use of Misoprostol. Dr. Ramiro describes the effect of these discussions:

Now there is more information about the quality of abortion. And I think the idea of
Misoprostol and the depenalization of abortion have been democratized, and knowledge
about reproductive health as well (Author Interview with Molina, January 13, 2017).

As a result, by democratizing information about abortion, the creation of the law has
acted alongside some of the NGOs that provide informal regulation of the black market, by
providing information about the presence and accessibility of Misoprostol. Even if this law does
not pass, it has already affected the black market for Misoprostol by allowing the spread of
information about abortions, and if the law does pass, this process will continue to increase the
accessibility of information about abortion and the black market.
The second impact of the therapeutic abortion bill on the black market for abortion in
Chile is that it may allow for an increase in the quality of care related to abortions, and abortionrelated complications, although it is unlikely to increase the quantity of abortions performed in
Chile. Although there are few therapeutic abortions currently performed in Chile, in relation to
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the number of overall abortions that take place, the real impact of the law will be in forcing
hospitals to update their techniques and improve their abortion-related care (Author Interview
with Soto, January 25, 2017). Dr. Dominque Truan comments on some of the changes that would
be made if this initiative were to pass:
There’s a lot of work to do, because there are many concepts we’re not accustomed to
that will have to be implemented…there will be changes in techniques as the doctors
aren’t taught about performing abortions with forceps or aspiration. The theme of
education will be very important (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

There is an overall view in Chile that hospitals are very behind in abortion-related
technique education, because medical schools have not been training doctors in these practices.
Ministry of Health official, Edwardo Soto, argues that “we are behind thirty years because we
still use D&C” and that there would need to be many improvements in hospitals if the law were
passed, including education about the use of aspiration for abortions, the implementation of the
use of Misoprostol in hospitals, and the use of accompaniment and advice-provision before
abortions, which currently are not part of abortion care within the Chilean healthcare system
(Author Interview with Soto, January 25, 2017). The Ministry of Health has been partnering with
the Ministry of Women and Gender Equity on the technical aspects of the therapeutic abortion
law, and in case the law passes, they are already planning for its implementation in 2018 (Author
Interview with Soto, January 25, 2017).
Consequently, if this law passes, it would vastly improve the care that women can receive
if they suffer from abortion-related complications from the black market, and it would have the
secondary effect of further increasing the information about abortions that is available to doctors
and to the general public. The passage of this law could also make the aspect of the black market,
which is based on performing abortions illegally in private hospitals, safer, as women would be
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provided with new, up to date medical care for their abortions. Finally, this law could also help
to democratize the information that doctors are able to provide to their patients (even those who
are not seeking abortion for therapeutic purposes) about obtaining abortions through some aspect
of the black market, because this topic has become less taboo for both doctors and their patients
to discuss.
The final potential impact of the passage of the therapeutic abortion law could be on the
level of government regulation of the black market for abortion in Chile. Some doctors in Chile
believe that the passage of the Ley de Tres Causales could lead to even less government
regulation than beforehand. This phenomenon would be because the legalization of the use of
Misoprostol in certain cases could normalize the medication, and make the PDI view the sale of
this drug as less harmful; whereas currently there is still a view of uncertainty about the safety of
the drug (although these views are not founded in research). Dr. Dominique Truan comments on
this possible consequence of the law:

I think that Miso will still be used for non-therapeutic cases. The cases of rape maybe
will go to the black market, and the first two will be treated in hospitals. Miso will keep
being sold as “aborto libre.” I think they’ll prosecute even less the sellers, because it will
be legal, there could be taxes but it wouldn’t be formally penalized (Author Interview
with Truan, January 30, 2017).

The passage of the Ley de Tres Causales would have a limited impact on the number of
abortions that are performed through the black market each year, but it could (and already has)
impacted the amount of information that is provided about abortions, Misoprostol, and the black
market, the level of treatment that women receive for abortions and abortion-related
complications, and potentially, the amount of government regulation of the black market for
Misoprostol. Although this government initiative may not have a large impact numbers-wise on
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the black market for medical abortion, one initiative that could create important changes in this
area is a law calling for increased sexual education in Chile.

Sexual education reform
Chile is highly lacking in the area of sexual education, as it is the last country in Latin
America to incorporate a law on sexual education (UCh lanza primer curso de Educación
Sexual…2017). This deficiency leads to increased rates of adolescent pregnancies, sexually
transmitted diseases, domestic violence, child abuse, and school drop-out rates. Adolescent
pregnancy is an emerging problem in Chile, and unwanted pregnancies are becoming a large
issue, primarily due to adolescents’ lack of knowledge about sexual and reproductive health. In
the last five years, the number of adolescent abortions has significantly increased, and around
one in every ten women who is hospitalized for abortion-related complications is under the age
of twenty (Montenegro 2000).
During the 1970s, Chile institutionalized a sexual education program for the first time,
but during the military dictatorship, this program was censored and removed from school
curriculums. Following the return to democracy, the Ministry of Health attempted to implement
a variety of other sexual education programs, such as Jornadas de Conversación sobre
Afectividad y Seuxalidad (JOCAS). However, due to pressure from the Catholic Church and the
conservative right, this initiative failed, as they felt that increased sexual education could lead to
increased sexual promiscuity. In 2010, the government created law number 20.418, which
established that “all people have the right to receive education, information, and orientation in
the matters of the regulation of fertility in a clear, comprehensible, and in some cases,
confidential form” and that all middle schools were required to provide sexual education (Salas
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2016). However, a law detailing the implementation of law number 20.418, was not created until
2014. Furthermore, these laws have been largely ineffective because the creation and
implementation of sexual education courses are the responsibility of the schools, not the
government, and many teachers lack the capacity to create these courses. Moreover, schools
oftentimes do not follow-through on this implementation (Salas 2016).
The main place where adolescents learn about sexual education is when they go to
hospitals to get contraceptives. Dr. Dominque Truan comments on problems related to sexual
education in Chile that:
The young kids are learning about sexuality and sex from porn. I’m a gynecologist and I
work with adolescent girls and I’ve seen that nobody teaches them, and the parents know
less than the kids. When there is sexual education in schools it’s about sexual anatomy,
and maybe about preventing sexual diseases and pregnancy. But about sexuality there is
nothing (Author Interview with Truan, January 30, 2017).

Furthermore, in 2016, the Municipality of Santiago published a book called 100
Preguntas Sobre Sexualidad Adolescente (100 Questions About Adolescent Sexuality). This
book answered a variety of questions about sexual and reproductive health, including anal sex,
contraceptives, and the morning after pill. However, conservative sectors of society were very
opposed to this book, and a mayor from Santiago took the book out of circulation because he
argued that anal sex did not exist (Author Interview with Troncoso, January 26, 2017).
However, there currently are a variety of initiatives that are attempting to address this
disparity in sexual education in Chile. Doctor Ramiro Molina, a professor at la Universidad de
Chile, is trying to allow Chileans to have greater access to sexual education by launching Chile’s
first, free, online sexual education course. One aspect of this program is a three-month course for
students and the general public, and the other aspect is a five-month course for primary and
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secondary school educators to teach them about sexual health, and about teaching sexual
education to their students (UCh lanza primer curso de Educación Sexual…2017). The Ministry
of Health is also working with the Ministry of Education to improve sexual education in Chile,
and Ministry of Health officials, such as Dr. Paulina Troncoso, hope that the Ley de Tres
Causales will create greater awareness about sexual education, and a higher societal demand for
this right (Author Interview with Troncoso, January 26, 2017). If there were better sexual
education courses in Chile, it is likely that the black market for medical abortion would not be as
large as it is currently, and would be less-used as a last resort for women and adolescents.

Conclusion
Through this thesis, I have sought to illuminate the nuances of the black market for
abortion in Chile, and the regulation of this market, which many Chileans and academics have
purposefully ignored. The situation surrounding the regulation of this market is truly “la política
del avestruz” because like ostriches, some Chilean officials purposefully bury their heads in the
sand to ignore the presence of this market, and the harms that it may cause. Consequently,
feminist NGOs have emerged to try and mitigate some of the dangers of this unregulated space,
while acknowledging the many benefits that it can provide to women who are left without
options. Hopefully, the government’s Ley de Tres Causales and sexual education courses will
come to fruition and reduce the necessity for women’s reliance on the black market and feminist
NGOs’ informal regulation. In Chile, there are many areas of sexual and reproductive health that
either are biased against the poor, or simply are too inadequate to provide women with their
basic rights to health. However, the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Women and Gender
Equity are working to provide women with greater access to these services, and until all women
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have access to affordable reproductive care in Chile, the black market for abortion will continue
to exist as an alternative, under the watchful gaze of domestic and international NGOs.
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